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Preface  
 
Postgraduate seminar series with a title Situational Awareness for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection held at the Department of Military Technology of the 
National Defence University in 2015. This book is a collection of some of talks that 
were presented in the seminar. The papers address designing inter-organizational 
situation awareness system, principles of designing for situation awareness, situation 
awareness in distributed teams, vulnerability analysis in a critical system context, 
tactical Command, Control, Communications, Computers, & Intelligence (C4I) 
systems, and improving situational awareness in the circle of trust. This set of 
papers tries to give some insight to current issues of the situation awareness for 
critical infrastructure protection. 
 
The seminar has always made a publication of the papers but this has been an 
internal publication of the Finnish Defence Forces and has not hindered publication 
of the papers in international conferences. Publication of these papers in peer 
reviewed conferences has indeed been always the goal of the seminar, since it 
teaches writing conference level papers. We still hope that an internal publication in 
the department series is useful to the Finnish Defence Forces by offering an easy 
access to these papers. 
 
 Editor 
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Designing Inter-Organizational SA System to                 
Disturbances of  Electricity Supply 
 
Heidi Krohns-Välimäki 
Tampere University of Technology 
heidi.krohns@tut.fi 
 
Abstract  
Purpose 
There have been several problems in information exchange between actors in the 
disturbances of electricity supply. For example in storm 2011 in Finland, a 
municipality had problem to contact their local distribution system operator (DSO) 
because they had only the phone number of DSO’s customer service, which was 
congested. At present, the situation awareness in disturbances of electricity supply is 
focused on every actors own perspective. In addition, present sources of SA are 
shattered. 
Methods 
In this research, the demonstration of inter-organizational situation awareness 
system to disturbances of electricity supply is developed. The design process has 
been iterative. The usability of the first version of the demonstration has been 
evaluated with Nielsen’s heuristic evaluation method. The needs of information 
exchange have been studied by user need interviews with one municipality and two 
fire and rescue service. 
Findings 
The theory of team SA is inadequate in case of disturbances of electricity supply. 
Different actors do not have common sub-goals. There is a need for extension of 
the team SA theory to cover cases where sub-goals are more likely linked to each 
other than common. 
 
The designed demonstration improves information exchange between actors. In 
addition, it improves the resilience of society in disturbances by helping the 
authorities to focus their actions to sites that do not have electricity and or mobile 
network. 
Originality 
The main difference that the demonstration has to existing methods is that there is a 
criticality database where information about sites that are highly dependent on 
electricity is stored. In addition, the demonstration combines information from 
multiple different actors to same view. 
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In this research it was clarified that inter-organizational situation awareness system 
can change the thinking about how the restoration process of electricity distribution 
network in disturbances should be formed. 
Keywords  
Electricity supply, Disturbance, Inter-Organizational, Situation Awareness 
Paper type 
Research paper 
1 Introduction 
There have been several problems in the information exchange between 
organizations in disturbances of electricity supply. Usually in disturbances, 
municipalities and authorities receive information from distribution system 
operators’ (DSOs’) web pages, like transformer level maps or lists that show the 
outages and their duration and by phone conversations. The problems that 
municipalities and fire and rescue services have in disturbances are just a tip of the 
iceberg. 
 
Widespread and long lasting disturbances in the supply of electric power has been 
caused by Storms like Pyry and Janika in Finland in 2001, Gudrun 2005 and Per 
2006 in Sweden, four storms in the summer of 2010, storms at Christmas 2011and 
two storms in autumn 2013 in Finland. In those storms, some individual customers 
were without electricity for a few weeks in the worst cases. In addition to storms 
that affect the rural area the hurricane Sandy caused widespread disturbances in 
Eastern parts of the USA in October 2012 including some cities. There were e.g. 
floods that caused outage to Manhattan in New York. In January 2011 snow load on 
trees caused widespread disturbances in Finland. [1]-[10] 
 
Storms and other severe weather conditions induce many of the long lasting and 
wide spread disturbances so called major disturbances. Nonetheless there have also 
been major disturbances that have not been especially long lasting but extremely 
wide spread, like the disturbances in the transmission systems in the USA and 
Canada in 2003 and in Central Europe in 2006 caused by human error. Both of 
these caused negative societal consequences.  [1]-[10] 
 
Typically, the disturbances caused problems in telecommunication, water supply, 
animals’ conditions in farms and with the coldness in private houses. The coldness 
of the houses has led to even some evacuations. The problems with 
telecommunication effected also to safety phones and safety buttons. [1]-[10] 
 
After the storms in Finland in December 2011 the Finnish Electricity Market act 
was changed so that DSOs should participate in the formation of a situational 
awareness and supply any information relevant to this purpose to the responsible 
authorities. [11] 
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In major disturbances of electricity, there are multiple actors involved, like DSOs, 
contractors, fire and rescue services, emergency response centres, police, 
municipalities, voluntary organizations and customers. All the actors are obligated to 
maintain their capability to carry out their duties related to major disturbance. Major 
disturbances cause them also more duties e.g. fire and rescue services help people 
out from the elevators and municipalities arrange evacuations and check if elderly 
people need help. [3] 
 
In relevant studies they have noticed several problems with inter-organizational 
situation awareness in major disturbances in Germany. There are problems with 
distributed information, missing awareness about available information, policy issues 
of information, handling the uncertainties of information, terminology issues and 
perceiving interdependencies between information. The policy issues and workload 
issues prefer that there is no need for common awareness for every actor. Instead 
shared information should be individualized or localized. Same issues have been 
noticed also in Finland. [1]-[6], [12], [13] 
 
In this research a demonstration of the situation awareness system has been 
developed to improve inter-organizational situation awareness in disturbances of 
electricity supply. Demonstration consists of an internet service which combines 
information about disturbances in the electric power supply from DSOs’ 
information systems and information from other actors. The demonstration 
illustrates how the exchange of information between actors could be executed by 
using a situation awareness system. In addition to present ways, the demonstration 
has a database which contains information of customers highly dependent on 
electricity. Usability of the demonstration has been evaluated by using heuristic 
evaluation. For further development of the demonstration, municipality and two fire 
and rescue services were interviewed to clarify the user needs. The results of the 
heuristic evaluation and the interviews have been analysed and further development 
needs have been noticed. The design process of this demonstration is presented on 
this paper. 
2 Disturbances of electricity supply 
2.1 Structure of the electricity networks in Finland 
Finnish electricity network can be divided to three different parts; transmission 
network, distribution network and low voltage network. The transmission network 
transfers electricity from power plants to different parts of Finland and it is 
operated by Transmission System Operator (TSO). The voltage levels in this 
network are high; from 110kV to 400kV. The transmission network consists on 
overhead lines. It is not sensitive to outages, because the poles are high and is not 
located on the tree lines. However, if there is an outage in the transmission network 
it may cause whole Finland, because all smaller electricity networks are attached to 
transmission network. [14] 
 
Distribution network indicates smaller electricity networks that transfer electricity 
from transmission network or from smaller power plants to low voltage networks. 
There are approximately 80 Distribution System Operators (DSOs) in Finland and 
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they have own operating areas. DSOs own the low voltage networks as well. The 
low voltage networks transfers electricity from the distribution network to 
customers. Usually the low voltage networks are short and there is only few 
customers attached to the same line. [14] 
 
The distribution networks are the most sensitive networks to outages. There are 
multiple customers attached to transformers of the distribution network. At present, 
the most of the distribution networks consist on overhead lines nearby the tree 
lines. However, nowadays the most of the DSOs are replacing the old overhead 
lines with cable and all the new lines are built as a cable. [14] 
2.2 Disturbances of distribution network 
In Finland, the most of the widespread and long lasting disturbances in electricity 
supply are caused by weather e.g. storms, snow loads or lightning especially outside 
the cities. The distribution network consists on radial lines. If there is a fault in line, 
relay will trick the whole feeder. Usually there are multiple customers connected it. 
Last year customers had approximately 4 hours interruptions in total. [15] 
 
When the disturbance is caused by storms the weather is usually causing problems 
to restoration process e.g. trees or lot of snow on the streets. In Finland, there have 
been many long lasting disturbances in last decade. In this research, a major 
disturbance in the supply of electric power was defined as a long lasting or 
widespread interruption in the supply of electric power, during which the fire and 
rescue services and one or more other public actor (municipality, police, etc.) need, 
in addition to the distribution system operator (DSO), to start implementing 
measures for reducing possible severe consequences to people and property. [4] 
 
The characteristics of the most relevant major disturbances are shown in Table I. In 
the 2011 storms were the expenses for the whole Finnish society were the most 
substantial ever. 
 
The societal problems caused by these major disturbances have been similar. There 
have been problems in water supply and sewerage, interruptions in 
telecommunication networks, and problems in farms with animals. There have been 
huge problems with information exchange between the actors e.g. in one storm the 
local DSO did not had information that one site was retirement home they thought 
that it was a regular household customer. On other case, the fire and rescue service 
could not reach the local DSO, because they had only the public customer 
information phone number and it was congested. [1]-[7]  
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Table I. Major Disturbances as Numbers [16]-[26] 
 
 
2.3 Actors in disturbances 
In this research it has been noticed that main actors in disturbances of electricity 
supply are DSOs, subcontractors, fire and rescue services, municipalities and mobile 
network operators. In addition, police and other authorities can be involved the 
situation. [1]-[10] 
 
The main goal that DSOs have in the disturbance is to recover their operation in the 
network as soon as possible. Usually recovering process is planned so that the 
customers with biggest consumption will get the electricity back first. Regular 
households and summer cottages are last served. DSOs are obligated to pay so 
called standard compensation practise to customers in disturbances. These are 
stepwise increasing compensations that are paid to customer when an interruption is 
lasting 12 hours or longer. [1],[11],[16] 
 
Mobile network operators are involved to disturbances of electricity supply, because 
there is interdependence between these two networks. Mobile network base stations 
need electricity to maintain their transmission. Additionally, electricity network has 
automation devices e.g. remote controlled switches which uses mobile network to 
operate. [27], [28] 
 
The goal of the fire and rescue service is to protect people, property and 
environment in danger. In disturbances of electricity supply, fire and rescue service 
has to maintain their operation. The situation can increase the amount of their task 
e.g. helping people out from the elevators or clearing trees from street. Fire and 
rescue service has many DSOs and municipalities in their operation area. Most of 
the departments have divided their operation area to smaller areas, which have their 
own fire chiefs. Missions to rescue departments come from the local emergency call 
centre. [29]  
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Municipality has multiple duties in disturbances. They are responsible of the health 
of their citizens. In long lasting disturbances, municipality may have to plan an 
evacuation. In addition, they have home care patients that have safety buttons, 
which may not operate on disturbances. [1],[29] 
 
The main goal that each actor has in disturbances varies lot. The municipality and 
fire and rescue service have some common in their goals; both are trying to save 
people, while DSO and mobile network operator are more focused on the business 
aspect. They want to restore their operation as soon as possible to minimize costs 
and compensations that they have to pay to customers. 
 
The main problem in disturbances is that the restoration process of the DSO is 
concentrated highly on economic aspects and not on the aspect of the resilience of 
the society. At present, the legislation and standard compensation practises are 
directing DSO’s goal to minimize the amount and duration of the disturbances. This 
is causing expensive measures to improve the resilience of electricity network e.g. by 
cabling. However, if there is a method to achieve improved resilience of the society 
in disturbances, it can decrease development need of the DSO. This can change the 
restoring order of the electricity network to more efficient way. Thus, it can help the 
fire and rescue service and municipality to maintain their duties in disturbances. 
3 The design methods of inter-organizational situation awareness 
system 
3.1 The design process 
In this research a demonstration of inter-organizational situation awareness supply 
to disturbances of electricity supply has been developed. The demonstration shows 
how the information exchange between actors in disturbance could be improved. 
The development process has been iterative and methods of usability and user 
centred design have been used (fig 1). The research has been going already five years 
so the situation in the field has been changed.  
 
Several cooperative workshops with different actors have been arranged during the 
development process to define the present methods in disturbances. The first 
version of the SA demonstration was evaluated with Nielsen’s Heuristic evaluation 
method. Based on the evaluation the demonstration was developed further. A user 
need interviews were done to two fire and rescue services and one municipality. In 
addition, the demonstration was presented to them and questions about developing 
ideas were asked. Further the demonstration was improved.  
 
 
Figure 1. Iterative design process of the demonstration 
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3.2 Heuristic Evaluation  
The heuristic evaluation was executed to our demonstration based on Nielsen’s 
heuristic evaluation method. The meaning of the evaluation was that demonstration 
could be further developed into user-friendlier. Heuristic evaluation is done by 
observing the user interface and trying to form an opinion about good and bad parts 
of the user interface. The theory uses ten basic principles which been observed. 
Those principles are:  
 
• Simple and natural dialogue 
• Speak the user’s language 
• Minimize the users’ memory load 
• Consistency 
• Feedback 
• Clearly marked exits 
• Shortcuts 
• Good error messages 
• Prevent errors 
• Help and documentation 
 
The problem of the heuristic evaluation is that individual evaluator will miss most of 
the usability problems in a user interface. It is recommended that there should be 
three to five evaluators to recognize most of the problems. [30], [31]  
 
In this research three different evaluators observed all of the heuristic elements 
from the demonstration. The evaluators were three students from the Technical 
University of Tampere and have not been part of the developing process of the 
system.  
3.3 User need interviews 
In the interviews, the present methods achieving the situation awareness were 
studied. Further, it was solved what information interviewees needed to carry out 
their duties. The interview was semi-structured i.e. there were planned questions, 
but some of them were changed during the interview based on the previous 
answers. Further, a version about demonstration of situation awareness system was 
presented for the second fire and rescue department and municipality and opinion 
of it was asked. The demonstration was further developed based on the results of 
these interviews. 
 
The interviewee from first fire and rescue service was working as an operator in 
their main fire and rescue department. This fire and rescue service has 22 
municipalities and seven DSOs in their operating area. The respondent from the 
second fire and rescue department was working as a chief fire officer. This fire and 
rescue service has 11 municipalities and two DSOs in their operating area. From the 
municipality the interviewed was a leader of social services. The second fire and 
rescue department which was interviewed operates in the area of this municipality 
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The questions concerned about the usability of the demonstration and development 
ideas that interviewees have. Based on the answers the demonstration has been 
improved. 
 
3 Situation awareness in disturbances of electricity supply 
3.1 Theory of Situation Awareness 
In this research, Endley’s theory of three levelled situation awareness is exploited in 
designing the inter-organizational situation awareness system. The theory is selected 
because it is well known and one of the most highly cited models of SA. 
 
According to Endsley, situation awareness (SA) can be seen as the triad of 
“perception”, “comprehension” and “projection”. In this three-level SA theory, the 
first level is to perceive the status, attributes and dynamics of relevant elements in 
the environment. At the second level the comprehension of the current situation 
will be created based on the information received at the first level. This means 
creating an understanding the meaning of the information. The third level of SA is 
the projection of the future about what will happen in the situation. Formation of 
the SA is an iterative process. During the situation new data is received and 
comprehension can be developed. Thus, the projection is improved. [32]-[35] 
3.2 Team SA and Inter-Organizational SA  
Most of the studies about the SA in the electricity network are focused on the 
DSO’s SA. However, the disturbance situation is more complex, because there are 
multiple actors which have interdependencies. [34],[36],[37] 
 
The basic theory of SA is based on individual’s situation awareness and usually it is 
extended on the team or shared situation awareness. The team situation awareness 
means that every member of the team has unique situation awareness that others do 
not know. However, each of the members can have some awareness together. Some 
of the information is shared for all members and they have common awareness of 
that (fig. 2). In some cases there can be also different teams co-operating so that 
they form a team of teams. [33]-[38] 
 
It is not clear if Endsley’s theory of team SA is suitable in the case of the 
disturbances of electricity supply. In disturbances, different actors are forming the 
team of the teams. However, in Salas definition of the team, the main features of the 
team are that they have common goal, their specific roles are defined and they are 
independent [34], [37]. The problem in the case of disturbances is that the 
organizations hardly have any common goal. DSO’s goal is to return electricity as 
soon as possible to minimize cost.  
 
Fire and rescue service’s goal is to safe people and property from damage. 
Municipality’s main goal is to keep their citizens safe and confirm water and food 
supply. In addition, the claim of specific roles in definition does not fulfil. The 
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actors have specific role based on their roles in society. However, there are no 
established practices which would define the roles in disturbance situation.  
 
 
Figure 2. Team SA 
 
As an extension to team SA theory [35] where the sub-goals have to be common in 
case of the inter-organizational SA the most important is that the sub-goals of 
different actors have an effect on each other. In the inter-organizational situations 
like in disturbances of the electricity supply, to find the needs of the SA, the 
interdependences that actors have should be detected. This way the link between the 
sub-goals could be found. The best example of this is DSO and mobile network 
operator; their networks are interdependent e.g. if the DSO restores the electricity 
to the important base station of the mobile network first, will they help their own 
restoration process by getting all remote controlled switches to operate. 
 
The second problem with the definition of the team, specific roles, can be changed 
easily by increasing the co-operation between different actors. At present, some 
DSOs have co-operation between the fire and rescue services. In this case, they 
have already some common procedures. 
3.3 Sources of Situation Awareness of DSO 
The sources of SA of the DSO can be divided to two categories internal and 
external (fig. 3). At present, the information systems that DSO uses are focused 
mainly to internal situation awareness. These systems are Supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA), Distribution management system (DMS), Network 
management system (NIS), Work management system (WMS) and Customer 
information system (CIS). All of these are designed to support the everyday actions 
of DSO. They are related to operations in electricity network like stability. 
[1],[29],[39] 
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Figure 3. Sources of Internal and External SA of the DSO 
 
SCADA collects the status and measurement data e.g. from substations. This 
information is used to control the network. DMS connects data from SCADA and 
NIS to map based user interface. With DMS the overall picture about the network 
can be seen. It can be used to plan and to make the reconnections in the network. 
At disturbance situation DMS is important tool to locate the outages and to get an 
overall awareness of the situation. [1],[29], [39] 
 
In addition, the work management system is important tool in disturbances. The 
WMS system is used to locate the repairer teams and to communicate with them. It 
can be used to share tasks and send teams to right places to fix faults. [1] 
 
The external situation awareness of DSO can be divided to information that DSO 
shares to other actors and customers and to information that DSO receives from 
others. The situation of transmission network is the main information that DSO 
needs, because if something happens it can affect the DSO’s network. Some of the 
DSOs want to follow the outages of their neighbour DSOs’ networks to predict if 
storm is coming to their operating area. However, public web pages are only way to 
do it. In addition to their systems DSO gets weather forecast and warnings from 
local meteorological institute. Other information that DSO receives can be e.g. tasks 
of fire and rescue services. [1] 
 
Some DSOs are co-operating with their local mobile network operators to receive 
information about the location of the important base stations of mobile network. In 
addition, they may follow the service information of the mobile network from 
operator’s public webpage. Some DSOs are maintaining a database about customers 
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that are highly dependent on electricity. However, this information is usually 
outdated because there are no established practices. [1],[2] 
 
In questionnaire made at 2010 to Finish DSOs it was relieved that main means of 
communication with other actors in long lasting and widespread disturbance were 
mobile phone (96%), phone (59%) and e-mail (54.9%). Since that methods have 
been improved. [29] 
 
At present, the information that DSO shares to others is focused mainly on their 
web pages. Most of the DSOs have a map in their web page where it can be seen 
where the outage is (in transformer level), when it has started, when the estimated 
end time is and how many customers it affects. This information comes from 
DSO’s DMS. Some DSOs exploits DMS also to share more specific information to 
repairers, subcontractors and fire and rescue services. This so called DMS service is 
originally designed to share information to subcontractors so it is direct view from 
DMS. In some cases, a representative from fire and rescue service has come to 
DSO’s operating room in disturbance to get a picture of the situation. [1],[2] 
3.4 Sources of Situation Awareness of Fire and rescue service 
Like in DSO’s case the situation awareness of fire and rescue service in disturbance 
situation is focused highly on their own actions. Fire and rescue services are having 
information systems were they can receive tasks from emergency response centre 
and were they can follow their units. The fire and rescue service has to be able to 
maintain their duties in every condition so they are focusing that in disturbances 
also. [1],[29] 
 
Few fire and rescue services have DMS service from their local DSO to follow the 
disturbance situation. However, most of them are still employing the public web 
pages that DSOs offers. Many times fire and rescue services will get first 
information about disturbance from the citizens, when there is tree on electricity 
line. In addition to DSO’s systems, fire and rescue services are receiving weather 
forecast and warnings from local meteorological institute. [1],[29] 
3.5 Sources of Situation Awareness of Municipality 
Municipality’s sources of internal situation awareness in disturbances consist of 
different databases and information systems that they have to follow their 
customers and citizens. Different organizations of the municipality have own 
systems e.g. homecare patients can be found from one system and locations of 
elderly people from other. These systems are not usually connected with any map, 
so in disturbances also map systems are needed to locate which customers are in 
disturbance area. [1],[29] 
 
Municipalities do not have specific systems to follow disturbances. In most of the 
cases they are relying to DSO’s public web pages. Some municipalities receive 
information about disturbances from their local fire and rescue services. That can be 
handled via SMS, e-mail or phone calls. [1],[29] 
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3.6. Problems with current methods 
The common for these information systems is that they are focused mainly on level 
one and level two SA. These systems present information about current situation 
and help to achieve perception and comprehension. However, there are some 
problems, because the information is shattered and comes from multiple sources. 
This may effect on the creation of level 2 situation awareness. However, the weather 
forecast is supporting to have projection to future. 
 
Another problem with present methods is that all actors are focused mainly to form 
an internal awareness of the situation. In addition, the information that is shared to 
other actors does not base on the needs of the information that others have e.g. fire 
and rescue services decides what information municipality could need and sent SMS 
about it. 
 
The situation of the DMS service is complicated. In the interview it was found that 
the users do not want to use the service, because of the lacks it has. It was relieved 
that the service should not be related only to one DSO. Fire and rescue services 
operate in are of multiple DSOs, so there should be information from every DSO in 
their area. 
 
In addition, it relieved that information from DMS service is not shared further to 
any other actors straight. Instead the information has been shared via phone calls. 
This could be improved with our demonstration. It enables sharing the information 
inter-organizationally. 
 
One of the main problems with the DMS service was that it is designed for the 
constructors of DSO and not for fire and rescue service. Thus, the language it uses 
is very specific and the system is hard to use without training. In addition, it was 
found in the workshops of the research that different users need different kind of 
information in major disturbances e.g. fire and rescue services and municipalities.   
5 Demonstration of the inter-organizational situation awareness system 
5.1 Concept 
The concept of the situation awareness system was developed based on co-operative 
workshops of the research and user needs interviews. The concept consists of real 
time situation awareness part and risk management that covers the development of 
network and preparedness. The concept can be extended to cover other critical 
infrastructures e.g. water supply. 
 
In the workshops it was clarified that there is a need for information about 
customers who are highly dependent on electricity so called critical customers. 
These critical customers can be for example hospitals, home care patients, patients 
with respirator living at home and different critical infrastructures. The main results 
of the interviews were that the fire and rescue services and municipality need 
information from all DSOs operating in their area from simple view. It would be 
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necessary that there would be only one system where all relevant information could 
be found. 
 
Figure 4. Concept of the inter-organizational SA system 
 
In the concept all information related to the disturbance is gathered to one system 
(fig. 4). The information can be e.g. outages of electricity supply, coverage of mobile 
network, weather forecast and traffic reports. The main difference to existing 
systems is that the concept allows feed information from multiple DSOs and mobile 
network operators to same system.  
 
The concept has a database to criticality information. Users can add information 
about their sites which are highly dependent on electricity to database. In addition to 
site’s location, it can include information e.g. time that site can manage without 
electricity so called critical time and the information how bad consequences will be. 
The DSOs and authorities can see all the critical sites from the system. This 
function enables DSOs to direct restoring actions to critical sites. In addition, it 
helps planning the network. This database allows this system to offer level three 
situation awareness by presenting the information about the consequences. 
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To avoid information overload the system enables filtering of the information from 
the users’ own operating area (fig 5). For example in the operating area of the 
municipality 1 there are two DSOs operating. Municipality can get information from 
the both DSOs to the same view filtered so that only outages from the area of the 
municipality 1 are shown. 
 
Figure 5. Municipality borderline filtering functionality [1] 
5.2 The first version of the demonstration 
The first version of the demonstration was built on Google Maps (Fig. 6). The 
demonstration presents all outages in distribution network in transformer level. 
Affected transformers are presented with blue lamp symbols. The system also has 
Google Maps’ street view function which can be used to look at the environment of 
the site more specifically. In addition it presents critical customers that user is 
responsibility of. Critical customers are presented with different symbols according 
what is the reason of their criticality. The critical sites are shown in traffic light 
colours depending on what the relation of the current interruption time compared 
with their predefined critical interruption times.  
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Figure 6. User interface of the first version 
 
More information about the critical sites and the outage will appear by clicking the 
icons in the map. The outages are presented with blue icons in the map. Blue and 
red clusters in the maps combines several outages close to each other. The number 
in the middle of the cluster tells the number of the transformers without electricity. 
The colour red tells that there are critical customers in the area of outage. In 
addition to the map there is the table that shows amounts of secondary substations 
and number of the customers in outages. There is also a list of warnings where user 
can see information about outage and the critical sites. 
5.3 Results of the heuristic evaluation 
As a result of the heuristic evaluation it was notices that in principle of simple and 
natural dialogue the demonstration has a simple view which is easy to handle by 
glancing. The view is light and easy to picture. There are only three main elements 
the map, the table and the warnings, which clarify the view. The most important 
element in the system, the map, dominates the view and is easy to notice. Using the 
clusters to combine outages next to each other minimizes the information brought 
to the user. Colours used to show the critical time are a clear way to express the 
criticality. However, if user is taking black and white hardcopy meaning of these 
colours disappears. This can be problem also for colour blind persons.  
 
There are problems with that boxes it uses are different in comparison with each 
other. When choosing the viewed page, buttons “Situation Awareness” and “Edit 
Mode” are presented with similar forms and different green colour and thus it is 
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hard to notice in which mode you are. Problems continue with the fact that all 
information does not fit into one view. It is complicated when user has to scroll the 
view in a different direction. Furthermore, the appearance of the demonstration is 
unfinished and the explanation of the symbols takes too much space. The 
appearance could be finished by adding softer colours and rounding the corners. 
The colours or the form of the page buttons could be defined better that it would 
be clear in which page you are. 
 
Terminology used in the system is quite specific professional terminology. However, 
it is easy to understand even if user is not a specialist. Symbols of the demonstration 
are simple and commonly known for example a red cross symbol for a hospital. The 
ways to present the criticality of the sites, by the size of the symbol and the state of 
the critical time, with traffic lights, are clear. In addition, the system uses radio 
buttons to add information to map, which is common way.  
 
Minimizing the users’ memory load is fulfilled by using common ways to login. User 
group “Authorities” does not have to give any input while using the user interface. 
Choosing the views that user want is easy by clicking boxes nearby the map. These 
all help to minimize the memory load, because user does not have to remember any 
commands. The user interface does not need specific studying, it easy to learn by 
trying different elements of the system. The elements that can be clicked are 
presented so that they can be recognized to be dynamic. Using the system is every 
time similar, because the elements are all staying in their places. User does not have 
to remember anything or focus when using the user interface. Continuing the use of 
the system after distractions is simple. All symbols are explained under the map, so 
the user does not have to remember them. 
 
Consistency in the system is great. The outage information is presented clearly, 
because only the customers who are shown are those without the electricity. Google 
Maps is very familiar to users and markers in the system works similarly than in 
Google Maps. The logout button is in the upper right corner which is a common 
place for it, so it is easy to locate. Different elements of the system are gathered to 
boxes so that there is on subject always in the same box. The problem with 
consistency is that “Situation Awareness” and “Edit Mode” buttons are presented 
with strong colours. It makes them dominate the view and user may think that they 
are more important element than they are meant to be. In addition, the tables under 
the map look different in “Situation Mode” and “Edit Mode”. There are consistency 
problems with info windows, some of them disappear when clicking them and some 
when mouse is not at top of the icon. In addition, in “Edit Mode” the info window 
has scrolling part in it. The user interface does not use any sound elements. Some 
voice signal to warn user when critical time is achieved could be added. However, in 
some using environment there maybe already too many voices, it could just increase 
the distraction of the user. The user interface works like related map based systems 
and that add consistency to it. The main problem with consistency in the system is 
that it does not work well with every internet browser. Some functions look 
different and some do not work at all when using different browsers. 
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There is lack in feedback in the system. Map updates quite rarely and it is hard to 
notice if it has already updated. There should be some kind of feedback to user 
when updating has happened. However, new information uploads quickly when 
user changes something in the view. 
 
Clearly marked exits are executed well in the system. Moving between different 
views is handled with buttons “Situation Awareness” and “Edit Mode”. Otherwise 
there is no need for exit any views. Different views of the map are easy to change by 
clicking boxes next to the map. Logout is placed clearly. However, it could be 
marked as a button and not a link like it is now. 
 
Shortcuts are executed so that there is possibility to hide symbol explanations. 
However, it is not marked clearly. In the map there are chances to zoom with 
mouse scrolling or with the zoom marks in the map. There is no possibility to 
personalize the view. When there are multiple organizations using the system, they 
may want to highlight different elements of the system. While login, the cursor is 
not located to the text box. It should be changed so that it would be already in the 
first box. 
 
One of the observed things was error messages. They are executed clearly in the 
system. If a user uses wrong user identification, the error message tells why login did 
not work. However, the place of the error messages could be on the upper side of 
the login textboxes. Now it is executed so, that there comes a new error page and 
you have to go back to the previous page to try to login again. These are the only 
error messages in the system. There could be also some error message if the update 
fails with the possibility to inform the administrator. In addition, error message 
about using the wrong internet browser could be provided. 
 
Prevent errors is fulfilled so that there are no chances to get the system stuck by 
using it wrongly. If user makes mistakes with the input of the user identification, it is 
not possible to continue before giving the right information. The user interface is so 
easy to use that the possibility of errors is small even without reading the directions 
or in problem situations. 
 
Because the system is still a demonstration there is no documentation with 
directions. The system does not give any instructions at all while using it. This part 
of observed things has not been fulfilled well. However, there is explanation for all 
symbols that map uses in bottom of the page and the system is quite easy to use 
even without manual. 
 
The results of the heuristic evaluation were that the demonstration has a clear user 
interface and it is easy to use even without a manual or training. In addition, the 
system does not add much memory load on user, and the terminology is easy to 
understand. Further, the consistency is good at overall even there are some minor 
consistency problems. The evaluation reveals that there are still multiple lacks in the 
development of the demonstration e.g. there is no manual and there is lack of the 
error messages. However, most of these problems indicate only that the system is 
still under the development process. Thus, those can be fixed later on. 
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5.4 Version 2 of the demonstration 
Based on the heuristic evaluation, the user interface was cleaned and harmonised. 
Further, the map was changed to open source. The user interface was fitted to 
screen size, so there is no need to scroll. The view was made softer by removing the 
box frames. 
 
 
Figure 7. User interface of the second version 
 
The main new character was the municipality borderlines added on the map (Fig. 8). 
These lines help municipalities and fire and rescue services to observe their 
operating area.  
5.5 The results of the user need interviews 
In the interviews, the response to the demonstration is mainly positive. Especially 
the municipality thinks that situation awareness system would highly improve their 
operability in disturbances. The functionality to add critical sites is appreciated. 
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Figure 8. New municipality borderline functionality 
 
The main results of the interviews were that the information needed varies a lot 
depending on the actor. The main needs are listed here: 
 
Municipalities need to know: 
 
Are there home care patients or elderly people in disturbance area? 
 
Is there a disturbance of electricity supply or mobile network in their operation area 
or in neighbor municipalities? 
 
Do the residents need help to get food, water or shelter? 
 
Are there patients with safety phones or safety buttons that do not have electricity 
or mobile network? 
 
What is the weather forecast? 
 
Fire and rescue services need to know: 
 
Are people in danger? 
 
Is there disturbance of electricity supply mobile network in their operation area? 
 
Is there need for evacuation by municipality? 
 
What is the weather forecast? 
  
At present systems, fire and rescue services are not able to send any information 
back to DSOs. Thus, the main need that the all interviewees have is bidirectional 
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functions to SA systems e.g. units of fire and rescue service would like to inform 
DSO if they see a tree on power lines. They are not allowed to do anything for 
those, which is why it would be good to have a system where they could mark the 
fault places that they have seen and sent it to DSOs. 
 
The municipality desires information layers that can be activated and deactivated 
easily. The main need is for layers of location of all elderly citizens and disabled 
people. The information about their outages can help municipality to target their 
evacuation and so improve their resilience.  
 
In addition, the fire and rescue service often needs information about which DSO is 
operating in which address. This could be solved with automatically finding service 
in the system, where the user could write the address or connect geographical 
information to the system and would receive information about operating DSO. 
This kind of service has not been executed in any of the present systems studied in 
the research. 
 
All interviewees think that the information about planned outages is unnecessary 
because in the case of the planned outages, the sites are informed beforehand and 
are prepared. 
 
 
Figure 9. Improved user interface of the latest version 
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4.4 The latest version of the demonstration 
Based on the results of the interviews the new version of the demonstration has a 
larger map view (fig 9). This version automatically filters the information to right 
operating area. However, user can change the filtering whenever it is necessary. In 
this version, the user can define what layers they desire when they are implementing 
the system. There is a menu on the upper right corner of the map where activation 
and deactivation of the layers is easy to carry out. To improve the visibility of the 
critical sites the size of transformer symbols is decreased to smaller and colour 
changed to grey. 
 
The main target of the development has been to improve the simplicity of the user 
interface. All interviewees were concerned that the system has to be simple enough 
because it is used in extreme situations. 
 
The view is personalized according the needs of information that user groups have. 
The personalization is made to reduce unnecessary information. There are 
information layers that user can add to map when the extra information is needed 
(e.g. municipality can choose a layer of all citizen older than 70 years) (fig. 10). The 
user can filter the map to show only their operating area to avoid information 
overload. 
 
 
Figure 10. Closer look of the user interface 
 
The level of criticality is presented with different sizes e.g. central hospital has a 
bigger symbol than local health centre. The situation has been presented with traffic 
coloured frames in symbol. This colouring system helps user to predict what can 
happen in future e.g. municipality can arrange an evacuation to critical customer if it 
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seems that the outage is lasting longer than the critical time. In addition it helps 
DSO to plan the restoration order. 
 
In addition to map there is event log next to it. Event log will give information 
about amount of normal and critical customers that do not have electricity. This 
information can be used to get an overall picture of situation. However, to get more 
precise information there are warning messages that alarms if the specified critical 
time of critical customer is going to exceed. These warnings are marked with traffic 
light colours. 
 
The latest functionality in the demonstration is information about mobile network 
coverage shown in figure 11 (the map layer has been removed because of 
confidentiality clause). This information comes from mobile operators system and is 
processed to layer on map. This information can be processed so that user sees only 
areas that do not have any mobile coverage. In addition, it can be processed so that 
it presents all coverage including those which functions still and those which comes 
from the base station which working on back up battery. 
 
 
Figure 11. Coverage of the mobile network functionality 
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This functionality can be useful e.g. to municipalities to find if there are safety 
button users who do not have mobile connection. In addition, DSO can utilize the 
functionality to observe if they have remote controlled switches on the area without 
coverage. This information can be useful for DSO when they will make projection 
about future. Thus, it can be utilized to warn the repair team that the 
communication with control room operator will be vanished. 
5 Further studies 
The demonstration of the situation awareness system has not been in live testing 
yet. The next step of this research is to test the demonstration in real life use. It will 
be implemented on two DSO’s operating room, to one municipality and fire and 
rescue service. With this life testing it is possible to achieve more knowledge how 
the inter-organizational situation awareness system could improve the resilience of 
society in disturbances. 
 
In testing process, different measurement methods can be utilized to detect the level 
of SA and work load of the system e.g. Nasa TLX, freeze tests and Situation 
Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT). The results of the test can be 
utilized to improve the system and to develop the demonstration to real system. 
Conclusion 
Disturbances of electricity supply are complex situations with multiple actors. All 
actors have own goals based on the legislation and responsible they have. There 
have been problems in information exchange between these actors. The sources of 
the situation awareness in disturbance is shattered and designed mainly on purpose 
of internal situation awareness. 
 
The theory of team SA has to be extended to cover inter-organizational situations 
where the goals of the actors are more like linked to each other than common. 
Disturbances of electricity supply are good example of this. The sub-goals that 
actors have in disturbances are affecting to each other. These links can be found by 
studying the interdependences of the actors. 
 
In this research it clarified that the present restoration process of the electricity 
network causes problems to information exchange. The legislation and standard 
compensations are directing DSO’s goal to minimize the amount and duration of 
the disturbances. However, the inter-organizational situation awareness system 
could improve the resilience of the society in disturbances, thus decrease 
development need of the DSO. This can change the restoring order of the electricity 
network to more efficient way. 
 
A demonstration of inter-organizational situation awareness system has been 
developed, in this research. The design process has been iterative and needs of the 
different actors have been acknowledged. Comparing to existing sources of SA in 
disturbances the system can provide information from multiple actors to one view. 
In addition, the demonstration supports level three situation awareness by traffic 
light colouring system and warnings. 
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In the demonstration, the view is personalized and the information is filtered. This 
is improvement for present ways to information exchange like DMS service that 
gives too detailed technical information to fire and rescue service. 
 
The design process of the demonstration has to continue to achieve the optimal 
situation awareness in disturbances. Testing in live situations should be arranged to 
detect its work load, usability and capability to support the SA. 
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Abstract  
High level of situation awareness is a key factor in many domains to ensure correct 
decision making and actions. Situation awareness has been studied extensively in the 
aviation and military domains but the research also applies to other domains e.g. 
power grid operations and managing disturbances of electricity supply. Based on the 
research design principles have been created in order to help system designers to 
create better user interfaces for systems used in operational activities. These 
principles have been applied when designing the situation awareness system concept 
for managing disturbances of electricity supply. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this article is to present the theory of situation awareness, how to 
design for situation awareness and how the design principles have been applied to a 
situation awareness system concept for managing disturbances of electricity supply. 
Keywords  
Situation awareness, disturbances of electricity supply 
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1 Introduction 
Situation awareness is a concept used in many domains ranging from surgery 
operation to power grid operation and aviation. It has been studied and used 
extensively in the aviation and military domains but it applies to any domain with 
operational activity. Situation awareness can be traced to the 1st World War where 
the military aircraft crews recognized it as an important component for successful 
operation. The term situation awareness was first used by the United States Air 
Force fighter crews after returning from the war in Korea and Vietnam. High level 
of situation awareness was identified as a decisive factor in air combat. Situation 
awareness during operation is crucial for the operator in order to make correct 
decisions and carry out correct actions. 
 
Situation awareness can be supported by systems used by the operator during 
operation. It is also possible for a system to degrade the operator’s situation 
awareness by providing information in an incorrect way. Due to this the support for 
situation awareness should be taken into account when designing systems for 
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operators. The systems designed in the aviation domain have long utilized the 
principles and best practises defined in the research but in some fields such as the 
power grid operations the situation awareness as a concept has only recently aroused 
interest. 
 
In this paper a demonstration of situation awareness system for managing 
disturbances of electricity supply is presented. In addition the user interface design 
choices for the system are explained in the paper. The Mica R. Endsley’s theory of 
situation awareness is discussed in chapter 2. The design principles defined by 
Endsley are presented and discussed in chapter 3. The designed situation awareness 
system concept and it’s user interface components are discussed  in chapter 4. 
2 Situation awareness  
Having a high level of situation awareness means being aware of what is happening 
around you and understand what the information means to you currently and in the 
future. The concept of situation awareness is applied to operational situations such 
as aviation and power grid operation, where an operator has to have situation 
awareness in order to perform actions correctly (e.g. in order to separate traffic as an 
air traffic controller or operator power grid as a power grid operator). In such 
situations only the information relevant to the current task is important for situation 
awareness. For example in power grid operations the operator does not have to 
know the age of the network components in order to operate the power grid. 
Instead he must be aware of the current load flows and the status of different grid 
components. [1] 
 
There are multiple models for describing situation awareness. A commonly used 
model was defined in [2]. In Endsley’s model situation awareness is formally defined 
as  
 
“The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and 
space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the 
near future.”  
 
Other models such as the perceptual cycle model [3] and the activity theory model 
[4] exist but these are not discussed in this paper. 
Endsley [1] divides situation awareness into three levels:  
 
Level 1–perception of the elements in the environment 
Level 2–comprehension of the current situation 
Level 3–projection of future status 
 
These levels are discussed more in the following sub-chapters. Each level of 
situation awareness is important in order to have an extensive awareness of the 
situation. The model has been criticized by saying that it states that the next level 
situation awareness cannot be achieved without achieving the previous level 
situation awareness [5]. According to Endsley, this is a misunderstanding of the 
model. The user does not need the previous level of situation awareness to achieve 
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higher levels of situation awareness the user still needs them to achieve an extensive 
awareness of the situation. [6] 
2.1 Level 1–perception of the elements in the environment 
In order to achieve any sort of situation awareness the operator must perceive the 
status, attributes and dynamics of relevant elements in the area. The information can 
be perceived through different senses such as visual, auditory, tactile, taste or 
olfactory senses. [1] For example in power grid operation the level 1 situation 
awareness consists of information like planned outages, load forecast, reserves and 
switch/breaker statuses. 
 
Perception of the information can be difficult. There are multiple reasons why an 
operator fails to perceive information. The operator has to be vigilant at all times. 
If the operator is not vigilant enough, it is likely that critical information will be 
missed. Perception of information can fail because of too much automation. Too 
much automation causes the operator so called “out-of-the-loop”-syndrome in 
which the operator does not know what is going in the system. Other operator-
independent reasons can also cause the operator to miss critical information. For 
example in power grid operation there can also be issues with the devices measuring 
the necessary variables. If the measurement devices fail to measure the variables 
correctly due to a fault in the device, it is possible that the operator performs actions 
incorrectly because of incorrect information. Another possible issue is if the 
telecommunication network fails to deliver the measurement data to the control 
center. In such cases it is possible that the operator is unaware of the network state 
and fails to make correct decisions in the operation. [7] In addition in the power grid 
operation the power grid is not the only subject the operator has to be aware of. 
The operator has to also be aware of the status of telecommunication networks, 
which can be difficult as the telecommunication networks are often operated by 
other companies and information exchange between actors is low. If the operator is 
unaware of the telecommunication network fault, it is likely that a lot of time will be 
wasted trying to send control commands to power grid devices instead of manually 
operating them. [8] 
 
Jones & Endsley [9] discovered that 76 % of pilots’ situation awareness errors 
occurred because of pilots not perceiving the information needed. Around 40 % of 
these errors occurred because the needed information was not provided to the 
person needing it or was not provided clearly due to system limitations or 
shortcomings. For example the runway lines had become faded and obscured. In 
approximately 30% of the cases the information was presented but was not 
perceived due to too high a workload or outside distractions such as a phone call. In 
some cases the operator did not bring up a view where the needed information was 
presented.  
 
In power grid operation the workload is often an issue in the major disturbances of 
electricity supply. There can be hundreds of alerts on the displays and operators 
have to coordinate the fixing with the repair crews. In such situations it is also likely 
that in addition to the operators there can be multiple people in the control center 
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such as a contact person from the rescue services, members of the media and other 
personnel causing the level of noise increase, making focusing harder which in turn 
makes forming high level of situation awareness difficult. [10] 
2.2 Level 2-comprehension of the current situation 
Having a good level 2 situation awareness means that the operator understands what 
the perceived information means for the operation. Level 2 situation awareness is 
formed by connecting level 1 situation awareness data with the operator’s goals. 
Information is prioritized based on the operator’s current goals. A good analogy for 
level 2 situation awareness is having a high level of reading comprehension as 
opposed to just reading words. In power grid operation the level 2 situation 
awareness consists of things like understanding the deviation between actual and 
planned states, the status of equipment, the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the 
system and available actions. If and operator does not understand what certain 
actions can do based on the current network state, the operator can execute 
incorrect actions and accidentally cause a blackout. [7] 
 
According to Jones & Endsley [9] around 19 % of situation awareness errors in 
aviation were caused by problems in level 2 situation awareness. In the cases the 
operators are able to perceive the necessary data but cannot understand the meaning 
of the information. For example a pilot understands that the altitude of the aircraft 
is 3 000 meters but do not understand that he had deviated from the level assigned 
by the air control.  
2.3 Level 3-projection of future status 
Level 3 situation awareness means the operator’s ability project future status of the 
situation. In order to properly project the future, the user must have perceived and 
understood the current status. User can create projections without level 1 or level 2 
situation awareness but the accuracy of the projections will be higher with more 
extensive level 1 and 2 situation awareness. For example pilots and air traffic 
controllers actively project the movements of other aircraft in order to prevent 
problems. [6] In power grid operation level 3 situation awareness means being able 
to project things like future system state and the time when to implement actions. 
[7] 
 
Only 6 % of errors in situation awareness occurred because of lacking level 3 
situation awareness. These errors are often caused by over projecting current trends. 
The amount of situation awareness errors because of lacking level 3 situation 
awareness is low because most of the errors occur in level 1 and 2 situation 
awareness. [9] 
2.4 Team and shared situation awareness 
In many complex domains such as aviation, military operations and managing 
disturbances in electricity supply it is often necessary for people to work together in 
order to achieve a common goal. Team and shared situation awareness are 
important concepts in such domains. The team and shared situation awareness can 
be seen in figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Team and shared situation awareness. [11] 
 
Endsley [1] defines team situation awareness as  
 
”the degree to which every team member possesses the SA required for his or her 
responsibilities”  
 
and shared situation awareness as  
 
“the degree to which team members have the same situation awareness on shared 
situation awareness requirements”.  
 
Basically shared situation awareness can be seen in the middle of the figure 1 where 
the invidual actors’ situation awareness overlaps. Good team situation awareness on 
the other hand means the situation awareness of each actor should be at high level 
for the team to succeed in completing the goals. In the figure 1 this means that the 
dark circles (each team members situation awareness) should be at high level. 
 
Panteli [11] lists the requirements for each level of shared situation awareness. The 
requirements can be seen in table 1. 
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Table 1. Shared situation awareness requirements. [11] 
 
Level 1 situation awaress: perception System 
Environment 
Other team members 
Level 2 situation awareness: 
comprehension 
Status relevant to own 
goals/requirements 
Status relevant to other’s 
goals/requirements 
Impact of own actions on others 
Impact of other’s actions on self and 
overall goal 
Level 3 situation awareness: projection Actions of team members 
 
 
In addition to actor’s own situation awareness requirements, actors have to fulfill 
the requirements set by the needs for shared situation awareness. The level 1 shared 
situation awareness requires the perception of other team members’ information in 
order to fulfill the requirements. The level 2 shared situation awareness requires the 
comprehension of own and others’ goals and requirements and understanding the 
impact of own actions on others and vice versa. To fulfill the level 3 shared situation 
awareness, the actor has to be able to project the future actions of team members. 
[11] 
 
It is important to have a good team and shared situation awareness in order to 
perform actions correctly. For example in 1989 a Boeing 737-400 aircraft crashed in 
Kegworth, United Kingdom because the pilot turned off the wrong engine. The 
flight attendants and passengers were aware of the engine on fire but the 
information was never passed forward to the pilots. Before the crash the pilot 
broadcasted that there was an issue on the right engine when in fact it was on the 
left one. Passengers and flight attendants assumed that the pilot made a mistake 
while broadcasting and did not forward the information to the pilot, resulting in a 
crash. [12] In 2003 insufficient information exchange between the Italian and Swiss 
operators prevented the forming of high level situation awareness and resulted in a 
blackout of the entire Italian peninsula. [11] In 2006 the lack of good situation 
awareness of operators caused the central European grid to split into three islands 
with significant power imbalances in each area. [13]  
 
It is also necessary to support the situation awareness of groups that consist of 
teams. This is often a case that the literature in the field does not discuss. For 
example in disturbances of electricity supply there are multiple actors which consist 
of multiple team members and each team member’s situation awareness must be 
shared with others. Each actors’ situation awareness composes a part of the whole 
group’s situation awareness. [14]  
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3 Designing for situation awareness 
Endsley [1] defines multiple general principles for designing user interfaces for 
situation awareness. Before applying the design principles, a situation awareness 
requirements analysis should be conducted. A situation awareness requirements 
analysis is an analysis that includes multiple different considerations. An operational 
concept is defined in order to describe the vision of how the system will be used. 
The concept includes the types of missions or functions that should be done using 
the system and also the system capability requirements from the operator.  
 
Environmental conditions such as ambient noise levels are also taken into account 
in the design process. In addition to these user characteristics should be identified. 
These include characteristics like gender, skill levels and special clothing. [1] 
 
Operational requirements of the operators should be determined. These include 
how the operators work, the types of processes they utilize and the operators’ need 
for interaction with other actors. [1] 
 
Endsley’s [1] principles for designing for situation awareness can be divided into 
three logical groups. The first group includes principles that guide how information 
should be organized. The second group includes principles that guide how 
information should be processed. The third group includes other principles that 
help to improve the situation awareness of the operator. 
3.1 Organizing information 
Information should be organized around the operator’s main goals instead of a 
technology-oriented way. Information should not be displayed based on the sensors 
or the systems generating the information. Information related to a particular goal 
should be co-located and should help to improve the decision making related to the 
goal. In order to determine the information required by each goal, a situation 
awareness requirements analysis should be conducted. The information gained from 
the analysis should guide the grouping of information across the user interface and 
ensure all needed information is provided. [1]  
 
A common problem for situation awareness is tunnel vision. When an operator’s 
attention is directed to a subset of information, the operator might miss critical cues 
about the current situation elsewhere in the operation area lowering the situation 
awareness of the operator. Designs that do not provide operator with a view of the 
global situation contribute to the attentional narrowing. Excessive use of menus and 
windows in the user interface also contributes to the attentional narrowing. A global 
situation awareness view should always be provided. A global view discourages the 
attentional narrowing. Current goal related detailed information should also be 
provided simultaneously. Global situation awareness view is crucial for determining 
the highest priority goals at any given point of time. It also enables the projection of 
future events. [1] 
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The user interface should also support trade-offs between the goal-driven and data-
driven processing. Goal-driven processing is supported by designing the user 
interface around operator’s goals. Data driven processing is supported by displaying 
the global situation. Displaying the global situation guides operator to focus 
attention to higher priority goals. Both processing methods are important from the 
situation awareness point of view and need to be utilized. By ensuring that both 
approaches complement each other it is possible to improve the situation awareness 
of the operator. 
3.2 Processing information 
Processing the information is important in order to improve the operator’s 
performance. In many domains it is likely that without processing the information it 
is very difficult to perceive all the necessary information to form good situation 
awareness. Processing reduces the operator’s workload. Endsley [1] lists some 
principles for information processing to achieve better situation awareness. 
 
Level 2 situation awareness information should be presented directly if possible in 
order to support the comprehension of the situation. As human attention capability 
and working memory are limited, information that is processed and integrated into 
level 2 situation awareness requirements will improve the situation awareness of the 
operator by reducing the workload and things the operator has to remember and 
work on. For example displaying the difference between the target value and the 
current value helps operator’s operation as no calculating needs to be done by the 
operator. If both values are displayed the operator has to do the calculating by him 
or herself and do more work in order to achieve the same level of situation 
awareness. [1] For example displaying which actions are currently available for the 
operator based on the state helps the operator. If the operator has to manually 
calculate if it is acceptable to open a certain switch/breaker, the actions take longer 
to initiate and it is more likely that the operator’s actions cause issues in the power 
grid.  
 
A system should also provide assistance for level 3 situation awareness projections. 
Projection of future state is a demanding task for an operator and requires a well-
developed mental model. A system that provides projections of events and states 
improves the level 3 situation awareness of the operator. Inexperienced operators 
benefit from projections even more as their own ability to project future states and 
events is weaker. In addition a user interface that provides projections of future also 
supports the operator’s own ability to create projections. While a system should 
provide level 3 situation awareness information, it is often difficult to create system-
generated projections of the situation. For some information this is simple. For 
example a trend display that displays the changes of a parameter over time can be 
very helpful for operators’ ability to project future changes in the parameter. In 
power grid this could be for example a load flow over time display where the 
operator can see how the load flow changes. [1] 
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Information overload is an issue in complex systems. There could be thousands of 
events in the user interface of a complex system without any processing which is 
why it is important to filter unnecessary information to improve the situation 
awareness of the user. If too much information is shown on the user interface, it is 
likely that the operator misses critical cues about the situation. Information filtering 
should still be used carefully as it can lower the situation awareness of the operator. 
Using a computer to decide what to show to the operator usually degrades the 
situation awareness of the operator and should not be used extensively. [1] 
 
Filtering the information lowers the global situation awareness of the operator. 
Situation awareness is developed by observing system dynamics and trends over 
time. In cases where the system filters some of the information, the situation 
awareness could be lower as the operator cannot observe all of the system dynamics 
and trends. Filtering information might reduce the operator’s capability of 
projecting the future. If a system tries to filter information based on the current 
situation, information that is critical for projecting the future might be filtered out. 
On the other hand it is often difficult to define what is needed for future 
projections, which is why it is often difficult to perform filtering correctly. 
Individual differences between operators might also cause issues in filtering. Some 
operators might benefit from a certain type of filtering while others’ situation 
awareness can degrade. Generally displaying the information in a clear way while 
allowing the operator to decide what to look at and what to filter, is better than 
computer-driven strategies for providing only subsets of information. This way the 
operator’s ability to maintain high level of system and predictive awareness will be 
improved. [1] 
3.3 Other principles 
Critical cues for activating mental models and schemata need to be determined and 
made salient in the user interface as mental models and schemata are hypothesized 
to key features in achieving higher levels of situation awareness. For example in 
power grid operation if a certain switch-disconnector tripping triggers a situation 
(e.g. a hospital without electricity), a notification should be sent to the operator. The 
problem is that the critical clues are often very subtle and require years of 
experience to attend to. Because of this it is often very difficult to explain and thus 
cannot be added to user interface. In cases where the cue is explainable and 
important, it should be added to the user interface. [1] 
 
Taking an advantage of parallel processing capabilities should be done when 
designing a situation awareness system. A person can only process a limited amount 
of information through certain sense. Utilizing multiple ways of sensing allows the 
operator to process more information. For example people can only process a 
certain amount of visually received information. Utilizing auditory information 
allows them to process more information. Similarly operators can process 
information felt through skin simultaneously with auditory and visual information. 
Even if an operator is very focused on a certain subset of information on a visual 
display, it is easy for the operator to react to a loud noise or a tactile feedback. [1] 
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4 Designing a situation awareness system for disturbances of electricity 
supply 
In disturbances of electricity supply it is common to have multiple actors trying to 
recover from the outage. The actors have separate goals but they have to work 
together in order to recover as fast as possible. Due to this there is a need for a 
system to share the information of actors in order to improve the situation 
awareness of each actor. [14] 
 
Distribution network company (DSO) is the main actor working on the restoration 
process. DSO’s goal is to restore electricity to all consumers as fast as possible. 
During the restoration process the DSO has to prioritize restoration areas in order 
to minimize the losses caused by the outage. Usually this is done by prioritizing large 
important consumers like factories and hospitals. The issue is that small consumers 
can be critically electricity-dependent as well. In cases where a consumer has a 
ventilator, it is critical that the consumer is evacuated before the battery capacity of 
the ventilator runs out. It is difficult for DSOs to be aware of all critically electricity-
dependent consumers. Maintaining a database of critically electricity-dependent 
customers requires a lot of resources. By having a maintained database the DSOs 
can target restoration actions based on the criticality of the site and not just the 
consumption of the site. [14] 
 
Municipalities and special health care are responsible for many of the critically 
electricity-dependent people. It is crucial for them to know if any of the patients are 
without electricity supply. Without the knowledge authorities cannot perform 
necessary actions to ensure the safety of the patients. While the authorities are aware 
of the locations of the critically electricity-dependent people, it is difficult to 
combine the outage information with the location information.[14] 
 
Another issue during the disturbances of electricity supply is the amount of systems 
actors have to use in order to maintain a high level of situation awareness. Users like 
municipalities and rescue services often have multiple distribution network 
operators in the area. The users have to switch between multiple systems just to get 
the necessary information of the electricity network situation. In addition the users 
need to use other systems like their own customer databases to get all the necessary 
information to form high level of situation awareness. This increases the workload 
of actors by a large amount making the operation more prone for errors. [8] 
 
The situation awareness system attempts to fix the issues in sharing information 
between actors during power outages. The system combines information from 
multiple sources and displays the combined and refined information in a single 
display, reducing the workload of actors. A database for critically electricity-
dependent consumers is maintained in the system by the users of the system, which 
saves the resources of the actors as they do not have to maintain own databases. 
The basic idea of the system is shown in figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Diagram of the situation awareness system for disturbances of electricity supply 
 
Network state information providers are data providers that provide real time data 
about the electricity and telecommunication networks such as status of each 
transformer in the network and the coverage areas of the mobile networks. Users 
provide critical site data that is combined by the system with the real time data in 
order to show the users of the system the current situation and which critically 
electricity-dependent or telecommunications-dependent sites are without electricity 
or telecommunications. In addition to real time network data and critical sites data 
the system retrieves information from auxiliary data providers such as the rescue 
services, Finnish meteorology institute and Finnish transport agency. These data 
providers provide data that is useful for planning actions.  
 
The amount of information shared between users and data providers is huge and 
causes issues in the user interface design. It is crucial that users receive the 
information they need but it is also important that the user interface will not be 
cluttered with too much information.  
 
The user interface of the system has been designed utilizing the design principles 
described by Endsley in [1]. The design principles have been applied to the design 
and the users have been interviewed about the user interface. The basic user 
interface is shown in figure 3. 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The main user interface of the situation awareness                                                    
system for disturbances of electricity supply. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The map view. 
 
The user interface is divided into two parts. The map view and the event log. 
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4.1 The map view 
The map view is the main part of the user interface. By utilizing the map the user 
can easily see where the customers without electricity supply currently are. A range 
of information about customers without electricity is shown on the map. In addition 
additional information needed to restore the power to consumers is shown on the 
map. The map view can be seen in figure 4. 
 
Transformers without electricity supply are shown on the map as grey markers. By 
showing the transformers without electricity supply it is possible to show areas 
without electricity. There are a lot of transformers in urban areas which makes it 
possible to identify users without electricity just by using the information about 
transformers without electricity supply. 
 
In addition to transformers critical sites are displayed on the map. Each critical site 
type has own symbol. Critical sites are divided into three criticality levels: 
 
Low criticality 
Critical site 
High criticality 
 
The size of the symbol is defined by the criticality of the site. The size of the symbol 
increases as the criticality of the site increases. This way the most critical sites can be 
seen more easily. This directly supports the operators’ ability to spot the critical cues 
(in this case the most critical sites) from the user interface. While the higher 
criticality sites are bigger they are still relatively small in order to prevent them from 
blocking other necessary information. 
 
Critical sites also have a real time state. The state of the site is expressed with the 
color of the symbol’s outline. The state is based on the critical time of the site. 
Critical time is a time that the customer can be without electricity without causing 
major problems. For example a ventilator patient needs electricity for the ventilator. 
Ventilators have a backup battery which lasts for some hours. This is the critical 
time of a ventilator patient as when the critical time exceeds, the ventilator patient 
will have issues breathing. Critical site states are divided into three states: 
 
More than an hour until critical time will exceed. (green) 
Less than an hour until critical time will exceed. (yellow) 
Critical time has exceeded. (red) 
 
The state of the site can be seen from the outline of the symbol. When the outline is 
green, it takes more than one hour until the critical time will exceed. When the 
outline is yellow, it takes less than one hour until critical time will exceed. When the 
outline is red, critical time has exceeded. This way of displaying the states supports 
the principle defined by [1] that says that a system should support the forming both 
level 2 and 3 situation awareness. In this case instead of displaying how long the 
outage has lasted and how long the critical time is, a state is displayed that informs 
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the user how long it takes until critical time will exceed. By displaying just the 
duration and the critical time the operator has to calculate the difference, which 
increases the workload of the operator. In the case of multiple critical sites being on 
top of each other when zoomed out in the map view, the view renders the most 
critical site on top of the others.  
 
The colors of the outlines were selected in order to make the most critical cues the 
easiest to spot on the user interface. The red outline of the symbol can be spotted 
easily even if there are thousands of other markers on the view at the moment, 
granted the other symbols do not have red outlines as well. 
 
By clicking a critical site the user can see more detailed information about each site. 
When user clicks a site, a popup window will open which shows information about 
site’s criticality, state, address information and other useful information. This way 
the operator does not have to fetch the information from a customer information 
system or similar system. Hiding this information behind a popup clarifies the view. 
This also does not hide the information needed to form good situation awareness, 
though. Operators are usually not interested in the sites that have no outage but 
instead the ones without electricity.  
 
Critical sites can be split to different map layers. This eases the displaying of 
information in situations where there are a lot of sites. For example municipalities 
want to see all over 75-year-old tenants. There are a lot of over 75-year-old tenants 
which can cause issues if they are shown on the map permanently. Map layers can 
be hidden from the map which clarifies the view. According to [1] filtering should 
be done carefully and control should be given to operator instead of system 
deciding what to filter. This has been taken into account in the design. Operators 
can decide what they want to filter and can also look at the global situation if 
needed. In this case it is important to allow filtering as other actors such as DSOs 
are not interested in seeing all over 75-year-old tenants.  
 
In addition to transformers and critical sites other information is shown on the map. 
To improve the situation awareness of actors a weather forecast, current traffic 
situation in the area, rescue services activity and municipality borders are displayed 
on the map. Normally actors have multiple sources of information that is used to 
form the situation awareness. This increases the workload of the operator as they 
have to focus on multiple displays or switch between multiple windows in order to 
gather all necessary information. By displaying all information in a single view the 
user has a lower workload.  
 
Some of the other information can be used to project future events. For example 
weather forecasts help actors to plan actions based on the weather. If the 
temperature increases a lot during a cold winter day a few hours after a power 
outage started, it is likely that people do not have to be evacuated. On the other 
hand if the temperature drops even lower, it is likely that the apartments will get 
colder faster and evacuations are needed. 
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Municipality borders are shown in the map view in order to show which 
municipalities are affected by the outage. Operators can also see how many critical 
and normal customers are without electricity. Operators can also filter the 
information to just own area information. 
4.2 The event log 
 The event log is on the right side of the map view. It contains information about 
current situation in own area and also in the whole country. The operators define 
their own area as a list of municipalities of interest. Operators receive information 
about critical and non-critical sites without electricity in own area which improves 
the global situation awareness. 
 
The event log shows the changes in the electricity network state in chronological 
order. New outages and related information such as how many critical sites are 
affected are added to the event log. Whenever a new separate outage occurs in the 
network, it is added to the log. 
 
In addition the event log lists critical site state changes. The state colors used in the 
symbol outlines apply in the event log as well. For example when the state of the 
site changes from green to yellow (less than an hour until critical time will exceed) a 
new entry with yellow background will be added. The entry contains the timestamp 
and the site that was affected by the state change. The state change in the map view 
might go unnoticed if there are a lot of critical sites without electricity on the map. 
The event log helps the user to notice the changes in the state as the user will notice 
the new entry and act based on them. 
 
An example situation is shown in figure 5. In the figure the current situation in the 
country and own area can be seen on the top. The user can see, how many 
customers in the own area are currently affected and how many are in the whole 
country. This gives the user a good idea about the whole situation, not just the own 
area. This is important as different actors often have to support other areas’ 
operations. 
 
In the example the log lists changes of state for a health center and three 
telecommunications base stations. In the figure the timestamps of each log entry are 
missing and will be added in the future.  
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Figure 5. The event log. 
 
4.3 Future development 
The system is still under development and testing needs to be done. Some of the 
design principles defined in [1] have not been used yet. For example no parallel 
processing capabilities are currently utilized in the system. Due to multiple different 
actors using the system, it is highly unlikely that every actor can afford more 
advanced user interface (for example tactile). It also increases the difficulty of 
adopting the system in operation reducing the likelihood of actors adopting it. It is 
also likely that utilizing tactile sense is difficult in the domain. Auditory information 
has been discussed but auditory cues often distract the operator and should only be 
used for the most critical events. As the power outage progresses more slowly than 
for example a power plant operation fault, it is usually not crucial to perform actions 
in a matter of seconds. Most crucial actions like triggering a switch/breaker happen 
automatically in milliseconds. Auditory information should help the operator to 
notice critical issues but this is not usually necessary during the power outage 
restoration process. 
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A live demonstration with real live data from mobile and electricity networks is 
under development. During the live demonstration the actors that are active during 
disturbances of electricity supply will be able to test the system and the user 
interface during an actual power outage. The information received from the live 
demonstration should help in improving the system.  
5 Conclusion 
Endsley’s model for situation awareness is a widely used model in different domains 
such as aviation and military operations. The model defines three levels of situation 
awareness that simplifies the measurement of situation awareness of operators 
during operation. This allows the system designers to more easily design user 
interfaces for improving the situation awareness of operators.  
 
Endsley’s design principles can be divided into three logical parts. How to organize 
information, how to process information and other principles for designing user 
interfaces for situation awareness. These design principles can be used to design 
user interfaces that are capable of providing high level of situation awareness to 
operators. 
 
Designing user interfaces for situation awareness for disturbance management in 
disturbances of electricity supply is challenging. In the domain there are multiple 
different actors with varying goals. All actors main goal is to return to the normal 
state and minimize damages but achieving this goal is done in different ways. 
Actors’ goals are loosely linked. Actors need to exchange data and this data has to 
be displayed in a clear manner. The situation awareness system for disturbance 
management, designed using Endsley’s principles, tries to address the issues found 
in research and in practise in order to improve the recovery process and reduce the 
costs of disturbances of electricity supply. 
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Abstract  
The aim of this study is to examine situation awareness and methods to improve its 
quality in distributed team operations. The research paper is based on literature 
study, emphasizing especially the book Designing for the Situation Awareness by Mica R. 
Endsley. First the theory of situation awareness is explained shortly. Then a few 
methods to improve team situation awareness in distributed teams are introduced. 
Finally the results are discussed. This study is a part of a postgraduate seminar, 
which was organized by the Department of Military Technology in 2015.  
Keywords  
Situation awareness, Team operations, Distributed teams 
1 Introduction 
Correct information is crucial when trying to maintain situation awareness. Any 
information that spreads among the troops has an influence in their individual and 
team situation awareness’s and the quality of situation awareness effects directly to 
decision-making. The decisions that are based on false information can have serious 
or even fatal consequences in a battlefield. During operations, however, up-to-date 
information might be hard to get, especially when troops are decentralized along a 
battle space. 
 
Distributed teams are present in every military domain. In air operations pilots 
usually work physically alone in their cockpits. They get situation data by observing 
environment and different meters visually, and by communicating with others via 
radios. In sea domain navy vessels constitute a system where each ship or boat is a 
unit with a specific crew. Situation data is gathered by observing meters and 
environment, and by communicating with others directly or via different devices. In 
land operations troops are organised in units and then distributed to a battlefield 
where they communicate mainly via radios.  
 
To tackle the fog of war -the uncertainty in situation awareness during military 
operations- high level of team situation awareness is needed. Successful operations 
require that actions and different phases of the operation have been synchronized 
rigorously, which in turn demand seamless co-operation between military branches, 
different units and individual soldiers. All actors who are involved in an operation 
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have to be aware of a current situation, tasks and locations of friendly and hostile 
forces. It is essential especially in dynamic and fast situations as in air operations. 
 
Experiences from the World War II emphasized surprise when trying to achieve 
victories in air combats. For example German pilot Erich Hartmann with 352 
victories from WWII noted that before opening fire, 80% of devastated enemies 
never knew that he was there. The phenomenon was noticed also during the 
Vietnamese war when analytics showed that 81% of friendly and enemy defeats 
were caused because pilots either never noticed a threat or noticed it so late that 
there was no time to react. The state in which a pilot was shot down due to 
successful surprise was called the breakdown of situation awareness. [10] 
 
Usually complex and dynamic systems are full of elements that can disturb 
concentration on certain tasks. An excessive data flow and excess information can 
lead to breakdowns of situation awareness and cause several problems when 
individual’s data processing capacity is exceeded. Also, when team members are 
located in different places they might have problems in developing situation 
awareness of on-going tasks. That, in turn, might cause flaws in the progression of 
the whole operation.  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine situation awareness in distributed teams and 
to survey the most important factors affecting it. The concept of situation awareness 
for individuals and for teams is introduced in chapter 2. Critical factors and 
processes that affect in situation awareness are described in the same chapter. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on some general design principles that can help to enhance 
individual and shared situation awareness, and further performance of the whole 
team. Chapter 4 concludes a few main points of the topic and in chapter 5 there is a 
short discussion of the concept of situation awareness. This study is based on the 
book “Designing for Situation Awareness” by Mica R. Endsley and is a part of the 
postgraduate seminar, which was organized by the Department of Military 
Technology in 2015. 
2 On Situation Awareness 
2.1 The Concept of Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness (SA) is a specific knowledge that is needed for an effective 
decision-making, especially in the case of dynamic and fast situations. The situation 
awareness research is originated from the military aviation domain where good SA is 
critical but hard to achieve [3]. In the aviation context SA is defined as an ability to 
develop and sustain consciousness in air combat situations of where participants are 
located, what they are currently doing, and where they might be in the immediate 
future [10]. 
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A more common definition for the situation awareness is 
 
“the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and 
space, comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the 
near future” [1]. 
 
According to the definition, situation awareness is thus a composition of three 
cognitive processes that are perception, comprehension, and projection. Achieving 
situation awareness then depends on the ability to perceive relevant signals from an 
operational environment, to process the observed data to form a specific 
comprehension of the situation and to project its possible impacts on the current 
situation [2]. The model of SA in dynamic decision-making situations is presented in 
figure 1. All three levels of situation awareness – perception, comprehension and 
projection are presented in the core of the model.  
 
 
Figure 1. Situation awareness model in dynamic decision-making [3]. 
 
Good situation awareness means that an actor is aware what is currently going on, 
what consequences present situation might have in the near future and what kind of 
actions are required in that certain situation to operate successfully. Situation 
Awareness is a product of personal experiences and individual knowledge. The 
quality of SA is influenced by the limitations of a human’s cognitive capacity. For 
example, a short-term memory can sustain about seven blocks of information 
simultaneously [6]. If this capacity is exceeded, relevant information might be lost 
and it could lead to incorrect conclusions [4] and wrong decisions. 
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2.2 Shared Situation Awareness 
The ability to share personal situation awareness is essential especially when working 
as a team. A team is a group of people who work together to achieve a common 
goal or an objective [8]. Key factors that are needed for a successful operation are a 
common goal for the whole team, a specific role for each team member, and 
individual tasks that overlap [11]. A common goal motivates and gives purpose for a 
team effort by specifying what team members have to achieve as a group while 
specific roles define individual goals for each [1]. 
 
The roles and individual goals should be interdependent and overlap so that 
personal SAs could be shared and the team would be able to form a common 
situation awareness (see figure 2). Correct and shared situation awareness is essential 
for efficient teamwork. The definition for shared situation awareness (SSA) is 
 
“the degree to which team members have the same SA on shared SA requirements” 
[3]. 
 
Basically shared situation awareness means that every team member understands the 
present situation similarly. When there is a common understanding of the situation 
and shared situation awareness exists the actions can be synchronized more easily 
[7]. The way human brain process information depends on people’s individual and 
unique backgrounds such as education, experiences or hobbies. Hence the situation 
awareness is not identical between any two humans, even if they had the same data 
available. Whether the team has the same data in the same circumstances the SA can 
vary widely within a team. [3] 
 
Since team members have different tasks they don't even need identical situation 
awareness. It only has to be adequate. Team members have their own specific tasks, 
and the data needed to accomplish them varies. What is required is the knowledge 
of elements that are common for different tasks. The overlapping elements then 
define the data whose status should be shared with others. Especially when the team 
is distributed by time (e.g. time zones or rotating shifts), distance (e.g. geographical 
location or workspaces), or other obstacles. [3] For example military operations 
have always been divided in multiple phases along timeline and multiple units that 
are separated geographically. Operations were coordinated then by centralized plans, 
guiding what unit is doing which task and when. 
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Figure 2. Shared situation awareness – an overlap in data needs 
 
2.3 Critical Factors Affecting Shared Situation Awareness 
Team situation awareness model includes four critical and interdependent elements 
that affect the development of team SA and the sharing of situation awareness 
within a team. The elements are devices, mechanisms, processes, and requirements. 
All of them are needed to form a successful team SA. Critical factors and their 
relations are presented in figure 3 [3]. 
2.3.1 SA Requirements 
The SA requirements analysis defines all the elements that have to be shared 
between team members at all levels of SA (perception, comprehension, projection) 
to achieve correct shared situation awareness. It is not necessary to share every 
detail to everyone in a team. Overlaps in team’s information needs are the elements 
that improve common understanding of the situation and should be shared for all. 
Knowledge of a common goal, individual tasks and their current phases is therefore 
important. [3]. 
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Figure 3. Four major factors for the development of good team SA and shared SA in teams [3]. 
2.3.2 SA Devices 
Shared situation awareness can be supported by multiple devices, which transmit 
visual or audio data. SA devices that are used when creating team SA are means of 
communication, shared environment, and shared displays. 
 
Verbal communication is often considered as the most significant part of 
communication but people communicate also non-verbally. Body language like 
facial expressions or expressive behaviour can be even more important than words. 
Whether verbal or non-verbal, the communication should be efficient. The most 
effective way to improve communication and team SA is to operate physically in the 
same place with other team members. Communication is spontaneous when there is 
no need to use external devices to contact others. Non-verbal signals are easier to 
observe and interpret when the whole team is staying at the same place. In addition 
the physical changes in a situation or an operational environment (e.g. temperature) 
can be felt when working at the common space. [3] 
 
Displays that are in common use improve creating shared situation awareness. If 
team members need some specific information from others, they can just check it 
from the common displays. The ability to get relevant data quickly is essential 
especially when situation is changing fast or crucial decisions concerning present 
tasks should be made. Transmitting relevant information on displays remains, 
however, a central challenge. The choice of data that needs to be screened and the 
amount of details that should be shown are always case sensitive. Also the 
visualization of data is problematic especially when team members are from several 
organizations or represent different authorities. Despite of the benefits of shared 
displays, the research has shown that they reduce direct communication. Then 
people concentrate only on the information that is presented on displays. [3] 
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2.3.3 SA Mechanisms 
In addition to devices and communication skills, there are certain internal 
mechanisms that have an influence when sharing individual SAs with other team 
members. Probably the most significant of those mechanisms is a mental model. 
That model is a psychological representation of an environment and its assumed 
behaviour. Situation awareness is an abstract and dynamic phenomenon and mental 
models serve as frameworks to explain current situation and to estimate the future 
states of a system [7]. A chart in figure 4 presents relations between mental model 
and SA.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Schema, mental model, and situation awareness according to Endsley [3]. 
 
Training and common exercises support the development of a common mental 
model. Mutual experiences form a common ground for collaboration. A common 
ground is a frame of reference [5] and it means elements that are somehow mutual 
for all team members. A common ground can be for example a set of specific 
concepts or symbols that are familiar for all. Education, studies, courses or even 
cultural background are seeds for a common ground.  
 
Common mental models have several advantages. They help to build shared 
situation awareness for a team. They also help to focus actions toward a common 
goal. Teamwork is more effective when other team members and their tasks are 
familiar. Therefore the team should train together and gather experience on each 
other’s tasks and positions. Cross-trained teams have been shown to be more 
productive than the teams whose members have no experience on each other’s tasks 
[3]. When a team uses common concepts, communicates effectively, and knows 
tasks in other positions, the team behaviour is predictable in some degree, which in 
turn enhances the collaboration and response in acute situations. 
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Figure 5. Common Ground (Virrantaus & Mäkelä, 2008) 
2.3.4 SA Processes 
The development of shared situation awareness is dependent on good processes, 
which make teams work more productive. Effective teams have plans for 
contingency, which improve the projections of what might happen in the near 
future. Effective teams have leaders who set a common goal as well as personal 
goals. The leaders promote information sharing and communicate strategies, plans, 
and intentions to help team members to build their individual situation awareness 
on the same expectations and foundations. They rationalize their decisions and 
provide estimates, predictions and warnings of possible future actions. [3]. 
 
Effective teams put an effort to gain a shared understanding of tasks and common 
goals, which is necessary especially when a team consists of people with different 
backgrounds. Effective teams encourage other team members to express their 
possible variant opinions and visions. According to research, ineffective teams 
commit to three major mistakes that are misunderstanding the information, 
approval of poor situation awareness, and the poor organizational culture and 
processes. Ineffective teams may lack common objectives or the objectives are very 
indefinite. They may not have personal tasks at all or their tasks do not serve the 
common goal. Ineffective teams have often poor leaders. [3]. 
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2.4 Breakdowns in Situation Awareness 
A Breakdown in situation awareness means that a person does not know what is 
currently happening in the operational environment. [10] When working in 
distributed teams, the risk for breakdowns in SA is great. Breakdowns can occur for 
multiple reasons. Team members can understand the signals from environment and 
the elements of present situation differently. Task-specific concepts can be 
misunderstood or they can have different meanings for different members. [3]. For 
example in different military branches (army, navy, air force) certain concepts can be 
understood in various ways. Or if team members are not for example native in 
English, some words might cause confusion. Divergent assumptions can cause 
interruptions to team SA too. A team member might assume that certain 
information is already shared to others while it is not. Breakdowns in team SA can 
happen if members can’t interpret signals from environment correctly or the signals 
are just discarded. Multiple data sources can cause breakdowns in situation 
awareness as well. [3]. Figure 6 presents a principle of breakdown in situation 
awareness. The grey planes are aware of each other but do not see the green plane. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Breakdown of Situation Awareness. 
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3 Design Principles for Supporting Team Situation Awareness and 
Team Operations 
Team situation awareness is a composition of individual mental models that have 
been shared between other team members. The ability to share an individual SA and 
mental model is crucial when building a team SA. Forming shared situation 
awareness and maintaining team SA is a challenging task. There are six design 
principles to improve team SA and further team operations. 
3.1 Common operational picture COP 
Probably the most well known resource when building, maintaining and updating 
situation awareness is a common operating picture (COP). The COP supports 
decision-making. It is a document that is built upon the situation data. The COP can 
be transmitted via technical devices and shared with other actors. It is used for the 
assessment of a situation, its cause and its effects as well as for the management of 
available resources [9]. 
 
 
Figure 7. An example of a COP. [13] 
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Figure 8. An example of a COP. [14] 
 
The COP’s content has to be relevant and it should be updated continuously. The 
data quality is essential. It has to be filtered and chosen carefully. If there are 
multiple data sources for similar information, the integration of data is crucial. 
Excessive information can cause SA breakdowns. Hence the overlaps in team 
members’ information needs define what data should be chosen for the COP. The 
visualization of data has to be unambiguous, explicit and understandable for all team 
members. [3]. 
 
The good common operational picture mitigates sharing the situation awareness and 
further building the team SA [7]. When choosing the elements for a COP, it is 
crucial to consider the users and their needs: who is going to use the COP and for 
what purposes. The organizational cultures of different actors as well as the level of 
command define the extent and the amount of details that are needed for current 
situation. [3]. Examples of common operating pictures are presented in figures 7 
and 8. Figure 7 presents an Internet based COP that is constructed for co-operation 
purposes. Figure 8 is an example of COP that could be used in a military context.  
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3.2 Flexibility of COP 
The Common operational picture should be flexible so that only the data based on 
individual user’s requirements are displayed. Even if the data is from the same 
database. Each team member can be located in a different geographical place and 
they all can have individual goal orientations. Therefore the data that is presented on 
COP should support user’s objectives. In addition, team members with divergent 
backgrounds can have problems with terminology or symbols that are used on the 
COP. Hence flexibility is required at all levels of situation awareness when deciding 
which data should be displayed for different users. The level of operation and the 
branch have an influence on the data content of the COP. Also operational 
environment and time have an effect on the data selection. [3]. 
3.3 The Number of Displays 
The number of displays in a team should be restricted. A single user is not able to 
focus on several displays simultaneously. Important data can be missed because 
relevant signals are hard to recognize among the data flow. Research has shown that 
a short-term memory can maintain only about seven blocks of information 
simultaneously [9]. To enhance the team situation awareness, each member should 
have an individual display that transmits the data only for that particular user. Any 
irrelevant data is forbidden. Excess information is confusing and the whole process 
can be delayed if the user is not able to find crucial information in time. [3]. 
3.4 Shifting Between Displays 
The displays should offer a possibility to shift to other team members’ displays even 
if personal displays have been optimized individually. Personal goals in different 
tasks may be interdependent so there might be a need to know in what phases of 
operation others are. Shared display system should allow the possibility to view the 
physical situation from different angles (physical shift) and to view the information 
in relation to various goal states (comparative shift) with different data filters. The 
possibility to shift to others’ displays can build and maintain situation awareness. [3]. 
3.5 Visualization of Displays 
The ability to adjust visualization of displays should be restricted from individual 
users. In many operations several team members are likely to use the same display 
and they are probably used to certain symbols and color codes. If this visualization 
is freely adjustable the ability to build and maintain situation awareness can decay 
because other users may not recognize new symbols or colours. [3]. Two different 
graphs are presented in figure 9 –the Red Cross and the Red Crescent- that are both 
symbols for the humanitarian aid. In Islamic countries a crescent is equivalent for a 
cross, which is a common symbol for Christianity. If a user of the COP is not aware 
of this cultural difference it might cause confusion and even delay the operation. 
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Figure 9. A visualization example [15]. 
 
3.6 Cross-Training 
Shared situation awareness requires the knowledge of tasks and information needs 
of other team members. Hence the tasks should be cross-trained, which means that 
the team members practise in every position. Cross training helps communication. 
When the information needs are obvious to every team member the necessary data 
can be passed to others spontaneously. [3]. 
4 Conclusion 
Situation awareness is a state of mind or condition where an actor observes signals 
from an operational environment, understands their meaning for the current 
situation and knows how to operate under those circumstances. In other words, the 
actor knows what is happening and what kind of actions are needed to handle the 
situation. In team operations each team member should be able to share their 
individual situation awareness between others and further constitute common 
situation awareness for the team.  
 
The significance of team situation awareness is enhanced especially when there is a 
need for acute actions in current operation or the team is separated due to 
geography or time. The breakdowns in situation awareness can cause serious or 
even fatal accidents. Breakdowns can occur if a team is fresh or its members have 
different backgrounds, habits or concepts. Even excess data can cause breakdowns 
in individual and team SA. Team situation awareness can be improved by enhancing 
processes and procedures. There are certain technical devices available that can 
maintain achieved shared situation awareness.  
5 Discussion 
The most of the methods introduced in this paper emphasize the importance of 
different technical devices. The phenomenon itself is, however, a result of different 
psychological processes. To enhance the quality of individual and team situation 
awareness more attention should be paid towards human cognitive capabilities. 
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Maintaining high levels of situation awareness requires the ability to forecast how 
the situation changes due to different choices and actions that actors make. It is not 
enough to observe certain amount of elements from different devices but also to 
assess the relevance of data for current situation. If a team manages to achieve a 
high level of common situation awareness, it enhances the possibilities to be 
successful in their tasks although it does not permanently eliminate the possibility to 
fail. It doesn't matter how good a team’s situation awareness was in the first place, 
the mission can still be unsuccessful for example due to lacks in decision-making or 
unfeasible tasks.  
 
In a military context tasks and operations can fail because an opponent has better 
situation awareness. Situation awareness research is originated from military aviation 
domain, where high levels of situation awareness during the operations were critical 
and challenging to achieve. This was the case especially during the Second World 
War, where experiences emphasized surprise when pursuing a victory in air combat. 
Lately situation awareness research has spread to other branches as well. For 
example the new operating concept of the Finnish army emphasizes the importance 
of situation awareness during the operations.  
 
Situation awareness as a phenomenon is not a new although the concept of SA 
might be. The phenomenon has existed as long as there has been life on Earth. 
Situation awareness is actually a result of all those cognitive processes that have 
been needed for surviving and for keeping people alive. Nowadays its significance is 
just somewhat changed and crucial is team operations between different authorities.  
 
A high level of team situation awareness is challenging to achieve. Although there 
are certain processes and technical devices to enhance the quality of shared SA the 
technique is not crucial. Shared situation awareness is a result of effective 
communication between team members, whether it was verbal or non-verbal. 
Rehearsals, shared experiences and exact orders maintain the situation awareness 
regardless of random lapses in communication. But if the mutual exercises and 
training have not been possible, the communication is the only way to achieve 
objects.  
 
“The key to success in war, certainly to success in combined operations, is lucid 
communication. Indeed, clarity of communication may be more valuable than 
combat skills” –General Paik Sun Yup 
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Abstract  
Vulnerability analysis methods have gained more interest in recent years, because of 
publicity on international cyber attacks to critical infrastructure, emerging hactivism 
and business reconnaissance. From this basis there has been a lot of discussion 
about the costs of risk management in software development. In this paper we 
discuss vulnerability analysis in a critical system context. Critical system means here 
the system in which operative outage endangers the continuity of the organization. 
As a solution to expenses of the improved information security we define the 
concept of business resilience which gives a general reference on the relevant 
improvements to a system. We present an approach to determine the criticality of 
identified threat to our business. We also propose a methodology to utilize the 
business resilience properties on dynamic environment such as high security 
network used by the military. The discussion and views presented in this paper can 
be adopted in any organization with doubts concerning the sensitive and classified 
contents of current ICT systems in cloud computing. 
 
Keywords  
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1 Introduction 
Survivability and software vulnerabilities have been one of the top discussions in 
military systems for over twenty years. Same time as the technology evolves, threats 
to systems become more diverse and hard to identify. This has inspired the 
researchers to achieve modelling the environments and to change the threats to 
more computable form. There are various definitions to what a threat is, but we 
approach the definition specifically from the survivability point of view. Barbacci 
introduced survivability as “System class, that is able to execute task in reasonable 
time, even if significant parts are paralyzed because of an attack or damage” [1]. 
According to that, we define the threat as an event that endangers survivability.  
 
In this paper, we will discuss resource optimization when implementing 
vulnerability analysis in core authority systems. We define the key properties of such 
analysis. We also characterize the algorithms on how the analysis can be made on 
real-time basis in dynamic environment. We will narrow our observations to military 
systems in which the need for computational capacity is high and the reliability of 
information is always critical. 
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Economical risk management is optimization of resources in relation of identified 
threats and consequence damages. Systems cannot ever be built fully secured 
because of limited resources such as finances, expertise or time and ever evolving 
polymorphic environments. As a solution to modelling problem of such challenge in 
public authority environments, we propose a new concept called Business 
Resilience, which also improves information security in overall system. 
 
We also propose a combination of a higher and lower level vulnerability analysis 
methodologies which enables us to address investment to a component where we 
can gain the most profit of the information security improvement. With higher level 
vulnerability analysis we can construct an overall understanding of the system and 
cover the issues with the infrastructure level security and the information security as 
a concept. After this we can focus to more detailed components on the system, for 
example individual software or the operation of the system. With this we can divide 
and address the budget to smaller fragments with the most financially effective way. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we will examine the essence of vulnerability 
analysis by introducing relevant research of the field, defining its relevant 
terminology, characteristics and principles, as well as the benefits of the 
methodology within the scope of a military context. Next, we discuss on the 
business resilience concept and its key properties. Lastly, we propose algorithms to 
implement business resilience in a dynamic high security environment. We will 
conclude with key findings and a description of the future of business resilience in 
the military context. 
2 About Vulnerability Analysis and Related Work 
Vulnerability analysis is the process of identifying, quantifying, and prioritizing (or 
ranking) the vulnerabilities in a system. Modelling the critical infrastructure and 
identifying the most severe vulnerabilities are one of the key tasks for public officers 
in each country. The motivation for vulnerability analysis is also to have a 
measurable approach to policy making. It answers to the question that which 
components should be made more resilient to attacks and it determines the 
probability of a successful attack on a component. With combination of the 
component vulnerabilities and its probabilities on attack, one can quantitatively 
evaluate the vulnerability of a sector. However, the analysis is as comprehensive as 
the model accordingly. 
 
There has been a lot of research on attack, vulnerability and risk analysis. Some of 
them are based on network specifications [2, 3, 4, 5], some exploits graph 
representations [2, 6, 7] and perhaps the most popular approach is utilizing tree 
constructions like attack tree or fault trees [2, 8, 9, 10]. Vulnerability analysis has a 
close relation to survivability analysis and research [11, 12, 13]. There is also more 
comprehensive approaches that combine several of the methodologies like model 
based vulnerability and risk analysis method for critical infrastructure of society like 
the one presented by Lewis [14]. It exploits the network modelling as well as fault 
tree analysis. Instead of analyzing the system environment of the components, we 
can approach the data contents by dynamic taint analysis (DTA) [15, 16, 17]. It is 
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very powerful method for detecting vulnerabilities in applications like the one 
Herrera presented for Java malware [17].  
 
In this paper we adopt the approach presented by Lewis as a starting point [14], 
because of the scalability from the critical network infrastructure to the individual 
system component. With simplicity and practicality, it gives room for the additional 
methodologies and tools to enhance the presented risk assurance level. The main 
steps of model based vulnerability analysis and risk analysis are [14]: 
 
Listing of assets. Identifying all the components of the system.  
 
Network analysis. Categorizing and analyzing the relations of the 
components. Identifying the most critical component. 
 
Fault tree analysis. Building a tree representation of the vulnerabilities to 
create a fault or failure in a component. With vulnerability probabilities, the 
likelihood of failure occurring in a component can be estimated.  
 
Event tree analysis. The outputs of previous step are inputs into an event 
tree. An event tree contains all possible events obtained by single and 
multiple combinations of faults. With this step, assurance of all relevant 
vulnerabilities is enhanced.  
 
Event matrix analysis. The processed number of events can be reduced with 
event matrix by enumerating the single and double faults from the event tree. 
 
Risk Assessment and Resource Allocation. Determination of optimal 
allocation for funding to improve the components against the vulnerabilities. 
 
In Lewis approach the components are determined and to each component possible 
faults and threats are identified. The components are to be considered individual 
which reflects the possibility for threats to be multiplied if same attack concerns 
different components. This possible multiplication of threats is processed with 
event matrix analysis. It can be done, because the threats are considered equal to 
each other. Only distinction is the probability of the occurrence, not the severity of 
the possible damages. The risk probability is defined in (1), where probi is the 
likelihood that threat numbered as i occurs, n is the number of faults (i=1 to n), ci  is 
cost to reduce threat vulnerability i by 1 % point, di represents damages incurred by 
threat i. 
 
ri=probi-(ci / di) * (Slack / ∑ni=1 ci2/di ) (1) 
 
Slack represents the shortfall in funding (2) with the budget total M. If this shortfall 
is greater than zero, it must be spread across n threats. 
 
Slack = ∑ni=1 ci * probi - M  (2) 
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With resource optimization, Lewis presents allocation formula (3) where ri is the 
amount of reduction in risk i obtained by investment alloci (portion of budget M 
allocated to remedy threat i). 
 
alloci = ci * ri , for all i =1 to n threats.  (3) 
 
The equations above answers to question, how much it costs to improve the 
security with one relative percentage on one single threat. It considers the attack 
probability reduction in one component.  
 
As we stated before the vulnerability analysis has been considered very important 
method in military context. It has been considered a methodology with which a 
vulnerable targets can be identified and start preventive actions against threats. It 
guides the process management as well as the system software that is built to 
support it. With dynamic high security environments, it improves the awareness of 
the current security level [18]. However the challenge has been the computing 
resources needed to analyze the constantly changing environment and to address the 
sufficient amount of security with limited resources. In next chapter we propose a 
set of properties to be applied with vulnerability analysis technology. With them, we 
can identify the components or parts of the system to be secured more in order to 
use budget effectively. 
 
3 Vulnerability Analysis Conducted by Business Resilience 
Cyber attacks or cyber warfare are very popular topics on today media. Focus in 
these discussions lie usually on who is the perpetrator, what kind of attack is 
performed and how the attack could have been prevented. Especially the last topic 
can be a center of interest for long after attack or incident itself has ended. Duration 
of the discussion can be long particularly, if the attack has caused inconvenience for 
lots of people. The problem of this kind of discussion is that it usually concentrates 
on reactive actions and technological details of attack prevention. The discussion 
can be inconvenient to business being targeted and such vivid discussion can be one 
of the original goals of the malicious actor. It is typical, that little attention is paid 
for the real damage the attack really causes and why the systems should be protected 
in the first place. The consequence of the technical related discussion is, that the 
future security improvement investments for the systems of targeted corporation are 
possibly exaggerated and only against limited and media aware types of attacks. 
 
Despite the public discussion, it is widely known that the systems cannot be secured 
fully against attacks. The more system is tried to be secured, the more it costs. 
Actually investment costs increase exponentially in relation to achieved protection 
of the overall system. Systems which have little or none protection can be more 
secured with little invest. Similarly, to improve overall security in a high security 
system requires typically significant investments. 
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Moreover, it shall not to be forgotten what the system is protected for. The 
implementation technology, how the possible attack is conducted or the cyber war is 
never a reason itself for improving the system security. Systems have always reason 
for existence which is determined by the use in business. The criticality of the 
system is directly related to the how crucial system is for the business and how little 
failures of the system can be avoided without compromising the business. This 
means that the significance of the system must be evaluated by the business impact 
caused by compromised knowledge, compromised sensitive personal information, 
system outage or failure. Moreover the type of damage for business must also be 
noted and taken into consideration. Cyber threats can cause enormous direct and 
indirect damages. Interruption of business operations causes loss of revenue and 
income. Recovery of operations can cause expenses for a significant amount of 
time, even for several years. Reputation loss causes direct and indirect expenses. 
Cyber attack may cause legal fees, fines and/or sanctions. Loss of immaterial capital, 
such as research and development investment, will cause expected cash flow 
reduction. Exposure of sensitive business of customer data will cause direct and 
indirect expenses as well as reduction of cash flow and reputation loss. 
 
We propose a concept called Business Resilience to determine this tolerance for 
system security. We define the concept of Business Resilience as ability for business 
to survive after immaterial and material capital loss due to significant parts of the 
information system environment are paralyzed or exposed to open public because 
of a cyber attack or collateral damage in cyber environment. With business resilience 
we can determine comprehensive improvement of the tolerance against risks for 
organization. Main goal of this determination is to gain sufficient security level 
against identified threats with resources available. 
 
3.1 Properties of Business Resilience 
The properties to determine information security, sustainability and evaluation of 
Business Resilience in certain system are listed in Tables I and II. The Business 
Resilience is quantified by the financial key ratios of the business. We have limited 
the balance sheet values from this paper in order to maintain the simplicity and yet 
comprehensive model. For sufficient approximation at least key ratios revenue and 
cash flow must be observed. The limit of resilience defines in financial value that the 
business can tolerate in direct losses during an attack. In other words, it answers to 
the questions how long a business can remain unavailable and how much expenses 
corporate afford to recovery actions before bankruptcy. The reputation means the 
business reputation which might be lost because of the unsuccessful prevention of 
the attack or publicity of the exposed contents. It might cause the loss of 
trustworthiness of the business customer avoidance in the markets. The reputation 
can be determined as a financial value function over time. It means that the value of 
reputation loss changes over time. At first reputation loss of the corporation will be 
high when an attack and vulnerabilities of the system are published to media. With 
successful countermeasures and prevention of the increased damages the value for 
reputation losses are limited. On the other hand, if the succession of an attack is 
continuous, sensitive data is leaked to open public or the prevention of the attack 
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fails, the reputation losses increases. We assume that this continuous function 
represents the situation that the attack continues and prevention fails. Naturally, the 
value of reputation loss can be reduced by carefully planned information delivery for 
public.  
 
The business resilience is financial tolerance of the components that are 
compromised. At business level the collection of business components are as a 
property. Properties for each component are described in Table II.  
 
To avoid and decrease the losses of a cyber attack the risk can be transferred of 
shared. The risk transfer is directed to component. In business context total amount 
of transferred risk is the sum of all transferred risk in components. It is notable that 
for example insurance against cyber attack is a component in this model. 
Nevertheless the insurance component is in use, it is exceptional that the corporate 
could transfer risks entirely. Naturally all of the risks cannot be avoided. Residual 
risk must be accepted. The determination of the quantity for the residual risk is 
challenging to evaluate. A suitable approximation is achieved by analyzing and 
forecasting the possible change in cash flow due to cyber attack. In our model it can 
be calculated by summarizing the lost revenue of all components compromised by 
the attack and comparing it to the corporate cash flow. When limit of resilience 
equals to total lost revenue subtracted by the remaining cash flow the continuity of 
the business has become endangered.  
 
The last property for Business level is the investment budget that can be used to 
improve the information security. This property determines the possibilities for 
improving tolerance against cyber attacks. The technique for determining how the 
investment can be optimized and allocated to different components is discussed in 
chapter 3.2. 
 
Table I. Properties of Business Resilience in overall system 
 
Property Value type Description 
Revenue Financial value Key ratio on the income 
statement 
Cash flow Financial value Key ratio on the income 
statement 
Limit of Resilience Financial value The limit of losses that can be 
tolerated before bankruptcy. 
Reputation Loss Function of Financial 
value over time. 
Estimated value of the 
reputation loss due to an 
attack.  
Business Components Array of components Individual component 
properties are described in 
Table II 
Total transferred risk Financial value The total amount of 
transferred or shared risk. 
Information Security 
Investment Budget 
 Investment Budget for 
Information Security 
improvement. 
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In table II we describe the properties of each business critical component. The 
component will have a short description of the role and the meaning for the 
business. Business criticality is the numeral value of the criticality for business. The 
method for determining the business criticality is described in chapter 3.2. 
 
Table II. Properties of Business Resilience for each component 
 
Property Value type Description 
Component 
description 
String 
description 
Component name, description and role in 
system. 
Business Criticality Normalized 
value [0..1] 
Criticality of the component in relation to 
business. 
Cost of Investment Financial value Development costs of the component. 
Estimated Lost 
Revenue 
Financial value Expected direct costs if the component is not 
available due to an attack. 
Recovery costs Financial value Estimated cost for the recovery of the 
component. 
Immaterial Properties Financial value Estimated value of business advantage in 
relation to competitors. Value of immaterial 
capital that is bound to component. 
Sensitive data content Financial value Estimated value of the business confidential 
data which is on components responsibility. 
Customer data content Financial value Estimated value of the confidential customer 
data which is on components responsibility. 
Risk Probability Estimated risk that any of the identified 
threats will success and cause component 
unavailable. 
Threats Array of 
identified threats 
Identified threats towards the component 
with probability of attack succession and cost 
of probability reduction by one percetage. 
Minimum cost of 
security improvement 
Financial value The minimum cost for risk reduction by one 
percentage. 
Transferred risk Financial value The amount of transferred or shared risk of 
the component. 
 
Business operation is the downtime of the business and the loss of revenue in all 
lost business operations because unavailability of the component. Immaterial capital 
such as patents and IPR:s are the value for distinctive properties in the markets (for 
example the business secrets that gives the advantage towards the competitors). 
Customer data loss is the value of the lost, corrupted or exposed customer data. 
This data is business secret as well as it might be sensitive such as personal 
information or credit card data. Sensitive data is the data contents of the system 
which has some business value (for example the results of some experiments or the 
cost prices of the products). 
 
Success probability on threat in each component of the system may vary and the 
real cost what threat produces is its impact and damage to all influenced 
components. This dictates that investing with financial minimums, the threats to the 
system must be considered and to be decided what kind of real risk we are able or 
willing to acknowledge. We state, that the probability of successful attack against 
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business resilience is the probability of a threat succeeding in any component as 
presented in (4) where Fi is the set of components that are influenced by the threat 
i. Fi = {compj}, where the system component j is influenced by the threat i. 
Therefore P(Fi compj) denotes the probability for succession of an attack on 
component by certain threat i. We consider the threats to be nondependent to each 
other presenting individual threat in an attack. 
 
P(threat i) = P(Fi comp1) + P(Fi comp2) + … + P(Fi compj) – P(Fi comp1 + comp2 + 
compj)                                                                   (4) 
 
The risk function R represents the overall probability that some of the identified 
threats will succeed in system in some component. It is defined as (5) 
 
Rn = f(P (threat i1), P (threat i2), P (threat ns)),  (5) 
 
wherein n represents the total amount of threats and s the total amount of 
components. We simplify the above approach to represent it in more manageable 
form. We state, that it is sufficient to represent as a summation function where the 
risk Rj for component j is the sum of all probabilities of threats influencing that 
component, as in 
 
Rn = ∑ni=1 P(threat i).    (6) 
 
The collection of identified threats is connected to the component. Each threat has 
some probability for succession and evaluated cost of reducing the probability by 
one percentage. The calculation methods of the threats are discussed in more detail 
in chapter 3.3. On component level, the minimum cost of security enhancement can 
be determined by a minimum cost of security improvement as  
 
min (ci * Ri) = min (∑ni=1 ci * P(threat i)), (7) 
 
where . Risk can be transferred by the contracts for example to the service 
provider, customer, and subcontractor or to insurance company. 
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Figure 1. Logical illustration for the relations of business resilience, components and Threats. 
 
In Fig.1 the relation of business resilience towards components and threats is 
presented. The arcs from attacks to component illustrate the risk that successful 
attack presents and the arcs from components to business operations describe the 
criticality of the component. The weight of the arcs can define the relativeness 
among other arcs. The business resilience here is the tolerance for faults during 
outage of component within successful attack. The risk of outage can be transferred 
which enhances the business resilience. The reputation illustrates the business 
operations that are reviewed by the public. 
 
On next chapter we describe a simple method for determining the criticality of 
component. It is an approximation of the subjective interpretation of the strategy, 
but it allow corporate to focus limited investment budget to most crucial 
components. 
3.2 Determining the component criticality 
As stated before, we argue that the reduction of the optimal risk level or the 
probability of the critical point in system is relevant only when it is reasonable for 
overall environment. To evaluate the reasonability we propose a simplified way to 
quantify the criticality. Attributes that determine the business criticality for each 
component are listed in Table III. Value for determining the business criticality to 
be applied in each component can be found from the properties of the component 
(Table II). The good convention to determine the whole system is to proceed from 
top to down, to start with larger parts and break down into more detailed 
components. It assists in focusing the relevant information. Within Table III can be 
seen, that that different kind of attacks have different kind of financial impacts. 
Investment value is the financial value of the component and can be considered to 
be lost because of an attack. This refers the payback time of the investment 
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calculations which are not to be actualized. Value of lost revenue is the immediate 
financial damage and the impact of an attack. Recovery expenses are the costs that 
are actualized in order to restore the level before the attack. The value here is not 
considering the timeline of the recovery. Recovery costs can be also caused by 
replacement of the component. With immaterial impact, the value of the lost 
component can be considered as the amount of investment or with unpublished 
patents the loss of future productivity or income. 
 
We determine overall criticality of the component by normalizing the 
summarization of lost expenses v (investment value, lost revenue, recovery 
expenses) from component. In normalization the most critical component is valued 
to 1 and the rest by the relative value to the maximum value. We do not consider 
the security enhancements to a component as investments. That is, the value of a 
component in relation to business resilience does not increase by investing to safety 
measures. This is because the cost of outage does not change directly. However, the 
recovery time or expenses might alter due to security investment and that also 
changes the criticality of the component. Criticality of component Cj is represented 
by 
 
Cj = vj / max (vj),   (8) 
 
where  and S indicates the set of components in system. 
 
Table III. Matrix of attributes that determine component criticality. 
 
Impact Investement value Value of lost 
revenue 
Recovery expenses 
Business operation  x x 
Immaterial capital x x  
Customer data  x x 
Sensitive business 
data 
 x x 
 
Multiplying the criticality property of a component with the risk for component (6), 
we can prioritize the component improvement urgency. The closer the 
multiplication approaches to 1, the more urgent the improvement is. 
3.3 Characteristics of Business Resilience 
In this chapter we examine the characteristics of Business Resilience in more detail 
and present approaches how the information security investment can be most 
profitable. We alter the approach Lewis presented in model based vulnerability 
analysis from the threats to the components, because as we have stated, the 
components are the units that ensure business continuity. Instead of focusing 
individual threats on improving the protection of the system, we consider the 
component itself to be improved. In practice, instead of estimating the costs of the 
countermeasures against one threat, we consider the cost of the better component 
or the continuity of the system after attack. 
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Continuing with business resilience approach, the cumulative impact of the threat 
can also be treated. In large attacks, one threat vector affects to multiple 
components. On the other hand some of the large attacks may cause limited or 
none damage in one component in relation to business continuity. Usually it is too 
expensive to build preventive mechanism to each component separately against the 
attack, while the costs of the attack are limited to small proportion of the expenses. 
In that case we can approve the risk. But more importantly the threat must be 
analyzed to the business damage it causes. In that way we cannot bypass the affected 
components by the attack. The real financial damage of a single attack is the sum of 
all damaged components and their cumulative costs. 
  
We propose that the distinction of the threat is always the actual impact to business 
which differs from the original model presented by Lewis. This fact emphasizes the 
business resilience approach and those components that are most essential to 
business continuity are improved first with enhanced protection against attacks.  
 
With business resilience approach the criticality property of the component is 
emphasized. We agree with Fung et al. that in entirety of the system is as strong as 
the weakest link [19]. Moreover we assume, that the systems should be always being 
protected against common and known general attacks, and that the malicious actors 
behave economical way as well. Fung et al. proposed also a difficulty level in their 
attack model which stated, that attackers tend to find the easiest way, the one that 
needs least effort to be exact, to have the greatest damage in certain attack type[19]. 
Moreover, the probability of the successful attack is not as relevant as the damage, 
because we can be sure that in general there are malicious actors more that we can 
prevent our system to be prevented from. Consequently, the weakest components in 
relation to the business resilience must be fixed first. The mathematical downside of 
this approach is, that the most probable and expensive threats might stay with 
inadequate level of security and we approve that some attacks may occur. However 
we argue, that the criticality factor will take care that the most fundamental and 
crucial threats are taken sufficiently into consideration. And like we stated already 
before, the systems cannot ever be built to be entirely attack safe.  
 
Business resilience of the system determines if all business relevant components of 
the system are unavailable, the business will be over after certain time. The relative 
portion of the resilience PR determined by a component can be evaluated by the 
values of all components as  
 
PRj = vj / ∑ sj=i (vj),        (9)             
 
where s indicates the amount of components in system. Total sum of all component 
values must be always smaller than the business resilience. Otherwise single attack 
can damage irrevocably operative business or reputation of the organization. In 
public authority this means that the credibility of the authority can be questioned 
and the safety of citizens are compromised. The means to improve the overall 
resilience of the system can be made by the insurance or improving the information 
security of selected or all components. On latter case the simplest approach on 
improving the system is to apply (7) to single component. However, this approach 
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relies on local optimization and the instant improvements of limited financial 
resources. Improving one component does not necessary give protection against 
threat at large. That is why threat must be solved collectively on all components it 
affects.  
 
The total financial value of a threat towards our system can be calculated by 
summarizing the component values that are impacted by the threat on succession. 
We simplify the calculation to emphasize the threat value determining that with 
successful attack, all components that are influenced by successful attack are 
summarized to total value vi, as (10)  
 
vi = ∑ Fvi,              (10)
   
wherein Fi contains all the components influenced by the threat and v represents the 
value of the component on the set. In order to determine vicinity for the value of 
threat we compare it to the entire business resilience BR of the system as relative 
value of threat RVi  
 
RVi = vi / BR    (11) 
 
Security actions should take place, if total value of threat is approaching to business 
resilience value (ie. RVi ≈1). We also argue that if the attack succession probability 
of threat is greater or equal to the relative value of threat, the threat should be 
considered as a risk and action plan to avoid the risk need to be composed. 
 
The alteration in system affects always to the vulnerability composition, threat set 
with probabilities and the role of each component in overall system. That is why 
after every change on components the evaluation on the vulnerability must be done 
again. The methodology Lewis presented is comprehensive, yet too heavy to real 
time analysis on dynamic environment. We propose a modified attack tree approach 
to solve this challenge. It is described in more detail on next chapter. 
 
4 Real-Time Vulnerability Analysis in Dynamic Environment 
In dynamic high security environment it is impossible constantly to perform all 
steps from scratch that are carried in critical infrastructure protection and described 
in previous chapters. We present a lighter and more computative method that can 
be executed after different kind of changes in set of components. These changes 
include improvement and the reduction on security of the component, new 
components in the overall system (for example new nodes to network) and disabling 
some components from the network (for example if they are compromised in 
attack). We extend the attack tree methodology presented by Fung and Hung [8]. 
The attack tree methodology is developed to work in distributed SOA (Service 
Oriented Architecture) environment where services are employed to fulfill a system 
objective [8]. In our military context services are component of the system 
environment and can be considered as services, network nodes or critical systems. 
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In next chapter we observe how the business resilience properties are handled with 
the changing environment.  
4.1 The Impact of Business Resilience to Intrusion Modelling 
In Attack tree methodology, system will be inspected by the attacker aspect. The 
succession of the attack is the succession of top level goal [19]. AND –operation 
implies that all branches of the tree must be succeeded in order to succeed in attack 
and cause the system to fail [19]. The most cost effective way to improve the total 
security in AND -operation is to improve the security in branch where the 
improvement is cheapest. Similarly OR-operation implies, that only one of the 
branches in OR –operation must succeed in order to succeed in attack [19]. It also 
means that to improve the overall information security, the security level must be 
improved in every branch of OR-operation. 
 
In dynamic environment the vulnerability setting of the system can change rapidly 
due to intrusion or executed countermeasure. We combine the dynamic 
construction of high security environment to an automatic and constant 
vulnerability analysis. We utilize the business resilience properties in AND-, OR – 
and LEAF operations presented by Fung and Hung [8]. By this we achieve a more 
survivable and resilient environment against the attacks or damages. In Fig. 2 the 
sample attack tree construction in relation to process diagram is presented. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Sample attack tree construction from workflow [19]. 
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We need to be aware the resilience level of the environment after the change. We 
present four algorithms for modelling the change in business resilience: 
Initialization, resilience change in a component, adding a new component to system 
and excluding a component from a system. For awareness of the security 
performance, it is relevant to identify the location of the new component and what 
is the influence to the resilience of neighboring components. On the leaf level there 
is a single operation or a component which failure has an impact to the system 
execution. Leaf is the level that you can address the costs and impacts. The higher 
levels of tree are decreasing of increasing the total resilience depending on the 
operation.  
 
Algorithm 1. Algorithm to initially identify the resilience level 
 
First round with all Leaves 
 
Calculate component risk 
 Calculate component value 
 
If component value > current maxvalue then  
maxvalue = component value 
 
Second round with all leaves and nodes recursively 
 
If node is LEAF 
 Calculate criticality with maxvalue 
 Calculate improvementUrgency = risk * criticality 
if improvementUrgency > current maxImprovementUrgency then  
maxImprovementUrgency = component improvementUrgency 
 
If parenting node is AND –operation 
 node value = max(value of direct descendants) 
 node risk = max(risk of direct descendants) 
 node criticality = max(criticality of direct descendants) 
 
If parenting node is OR –operation 
 node value = sum(values of direct descendants) 
 node risk = sum(risks of direct descendants) 
 node criticalities = sum(criticalities of direct descendants) 
 
The computational cost of calculation is at most 3n(n+1), where n is a total amount 
of leaves. In practice this means that there are always at most two leaves as siblings. 
As we can see, the cost is polynomial and to decrease the computative power 
needed on real-time to this analysis, we suggest that the initial baseline for the 
resilience is calculated first. It can be made for example on Lewis model step three 
where the fault tree is built. 
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Algorithm 2. Algorithm for determination of resilience after addition of a 
component 
 
The added component is always a leaf. It is assumed that the parent of added 
component is not a leaf.  It should be determined how the component is added to 
system, ie. through AND- or OR- operation.  
 
With added component 
 
Calculate component risk 
 Calculate component value 
 
If component value > current maxvalue then  
maxvalue = component value 
set maxValueIsChanged to true 
Calculate criticality with maxvalue  
Calculate improvementUrgency = risk * criticality 
 
if improvementUrgency > current maxImprovementUrgency then  
maxImprovementUrgency = component improvementUrgency 
 
If  maxValueisChanged = true then 
 For each LEAF calculate criticality and improvementUrgency 
 For each parenting node calculate properties similarly in initialization phase. 
else 
With all parents of added component 
 
If parenting node is AND –operation 
node value = max(value of direct descendants) 
node risk = max(risk of direct descendants) 
node criticality = max(criticality of direct descendants) 
 
If parenting node is OR –operation 
node value = sum(values of direct descendants) 
node risk = sum(risks of direct descendants) 
node criticalities = sum(criticalities of direct descendants) 
 
It is noteworthy, that calculating the risk to added component can impact the total 
probability values of the threat. In other words, the addition of a component can 
have significant changes to overall system and re-evaluating the whole system 
analysis can be justifiable. 
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Algorithm 3. Algorithm for determination of resilience after excluding a 
component 
 
With all parents of excluded component 
 If excluded node has one sibling node then 
Exclude parent node and attach sibling to the parent of parent 
 
If parenting node is AND –operation 
node value = max(value of direct descendants) 
node risk = max(risk of direct descendants) 
node criticality = max(criticality of direct descendants) 
 
If parenting node is OR –operation 
node value = sum(values of direct descendants) 
node risk = sum(risks of direct descendants) 
node criticalities = sum(criticalities of direct descendants) 
 
The value of excluded node can contain the maximum value of the system. 
However it is not necessary to calculate the whole system at this point, because 
relative criticalities still remain. We argue that excluding components are caused by 
an attack and after recovery components are added again to the system. The max 
values are calculated during the additions of the system. We encourage that one 
component should not be overvalued compared to overall system and new 
components added to system should not exceed the max value of previous 
components. 
 
Algorithm 4. Algorithm for determination of resilience after change in survivability 
of a component 
 
With altered component 
Calculate component risk 
 Calculate criticality by with maxvalue 
 Calculate improvementUrgency = risk * criticality 
if improvementUrgency > current maxImprovementUrgency then 
maxImprovementUrgency = component improvementUrgency 
 
With all parents of altered component 
If parenting node is AND –operation 
node risk = max(risk of direct descendants) 
node criticality = max(criticality of direct descendants) 
 
If parenting node is OR –operation 
node risk = sum(risks of direct descendants) 
node criticalities = sum(criticalities of direct descendants) 
 
Restructuring the tree can be completed by adding and excluding nodes and leaves 
appropriately. We argue that the algorithms presented are suitable for dynamic 
environment, because change, addition and exclusion of a component need at most 
3k operations where the k is the level of hierarchy for the processed component. In 
those rare situations that addition changes the existing maximum value of all 
79 
 
 
components, the criticalities in whole system need to calculated again. This does not 
happen in normal operative execution, but in significant change in system. At that 
time the analysis should be re-evaluated in every case. With presented algorithms we 
gain the most important properties of the system for the two top levels. Properties 
are total resilience value, risk and criticality for portion or collection of components 
of a system.  
 
When improving survivability of the system, it is most convenient to have AND -
operations in critical components [19]. In practice it means that component services 
should be coupled. It can be expensive to build backup systems to every operation 
in large scale environment. However in high security systems, it is necessary that the 
compromised component or system segment can be turned off. This exclusion of 
damaged or compromised component guarantees the operability though with 
limited resources.  
5 Future work 
We find the next step is implementing the real-time vulnerability analysis and 
resilience determination algorithms to high secure cloud environment. We have 
planned to improve the algorithms by expanding them with system recovery 
features in order to improve the survivability of a system. The survivability of the 
system and the overall information security against certain types of attacks can be 
improved cost effectively by having attacking tools in countermeasure selection 
available. It means that ability of diminishing or eliminating the source of the threat 
is less expensive than building exaggerated and oversized security mechanisms. This 
approach changes the formulation of the vulnerability analysis from purely 
defensive view to more active defense. 
 
Another track under research is to have these survivability enhancements deployed 
into software development process seamlessly. The advantage of this is, that the 
costs of building security mechanisms to the system at construction phase is 
significantly less than adding them to completed system which is already in 
production. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we examined the vulnerability analysis within the military context. We 
stated that the improvement of information security must be considered by the 
properties of the business resilience. We identified the properties of business 
resilience and examined their determination and how they interact to overall 
environment. With the properties we are able to process direct and indirect costs of 
component for business when they are not in use. In addition, properties consider 
also immaterial expenses as enablement for future business. We presented quite 
comprehensive set of analysis tools for determining the risk of threat to our 
business and for allocation of the resources to components that are most vulnerable 
from the view of resilience.  
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With real-time vulnerability analysis in dynamic environment, we facilitate the usage 
of business resilience properties in dynamic construction of high security 
environment. We also achieve an awareness of information security level after 
recovery from an attack or after security enhancement of a system. We have limited 
the observations how to detect malicious attacks or how the component security is 
enhanced, but we presented algorithms to determine overall business resilience of 
the system after such events. With presented methodologies we can identify the 
vulnerabilities of the system in relation to business resilience, we can evaluate what 
we can achieve with the enhancements of the system and lastly we are able to 
allocate limited resources to most vulnerability components in order to gain best 
protection to identified threats. 
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Abstract 
Any independent sovereign nation will wish to ensure that their land forces are 
equipped to protect that nations interests. Technology for Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, & Intelligence (C4I) systems is advancing rapidly and 
even smaller nations must keep up. This paper looks at the types of considerations 
when planning and equipping a task force from the soldier platform to the upper 
tactical echelon. The paper will consider some of the key technology enablers that 
can deliver operational benefit. An architectural approach is given that will allow the 
right equipment to be used depending on the situation. This approach is 
demonstrated by 4 example architectures for different military scenarios. An 
acquisition approach will be proposed to ensure freedom, flexibility and value for 
money. Interoperability and other not material development areas will be 
considered. 
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1. Introduction 
As we look towards future military equipment and ways of working there are many 
aspects that must be considered. Technology drives much of the advancements but 
does not by itself deliver the operational benefits and capabilities that are required. 
It is important to consider all the development lines used in the US Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS, 2012): Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, 
and Policy (DOTmLPF-P). Whilst this paper concentrates on the Materiel or 
Technology any architecture and system must be implemented in a framework that 
delivers a complete system. 
 
The topic has been approached in the context of an independent tactical force and 
starts from the soldier/platform level to the upper tactical echelon. As an example 
this would be a Brigade size force with armoured, mounted and dismounted 
elements. This would include organic artillery, engineer, signals and logistic support. 
In addition they would have attached air and naval assets and a Special Forces (SF) 
component.  
 
84 
 
 
The Area of Operations is considered to be in the defence of the home nation. 
However, flexibility is retained as a key requirement and no assumption is made 
about fixed communications infrastructure. The proposed technologies are 
therefore applicable for more expeditionary operations. 
 
The time frame for the new capability is 2035. The various technologies will 
however mature at different rates and could be ready much earlier for insertion in to 
a legacy system. This will be covered later when considering a transition plan. 
 
Whatever the time frame some limitations will remain. Size Weight and Power 
(SWaP) requirements especially for the dismounted soldier are going to cause 
constraints. Access to the electromagnetic spectrum will remain finite and contested 
by other users and the enemy. Some of the technologies assessed may work more 
efficiently within these constraints. 
 
This paper assesses some of the technology areas in the first two sections divided in 
to communications and the application layer / software infrastructure. In the next 
section an architectural approach is proposed with examples in the following 
section. The paper then puts the system issues in context of other lines of 
development before concluding and suggesting future work. 
2. Communications 
Networks with the ability to pass data and voice are already common in the military 
domain. However, at the lowest tactical level the access to high throughput data 
which is connected to a larger tactical internet is not ubiquitous. New equipment 
such as Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) 
and biometrics demand a data rate that is not currently available. Some technologies 
which can help to close this gap are: 
 
Software Defined Radio (SDR). In the same way that a general purpose computer 
can run different software applications, a SDR can be reprogrammed to have 
different waveforms and frequencies. 
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET). These networks are able to form networks 
and allow data to travel between each radio and 'hop' across multiple radios.  
Cognitive Radios. These radios are more intelligent in their use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. They can detect where a clear channel is available and use 
it possibly multiplexing many different channels to increase throughput. 
Software Defined Networks (SDN). Enabling the inter connectivity of 
heterogeneous networks is a skilled job which often requires proprietary knowledge 
of different network equipment. SDN address these problems by allowing dynamic 
and standardised ability to monitor and configure networks. 
Software Defined Voice Networks (SDVN). All informed voice remains the 
most common method of command and control in dismounted forces. SDVN 
allow voice to run on top of data and thus voice networks can be defined 
dynamically. 
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2.1 Software Defined Radio 
SDR has the potential to make the selection, upgrade and operation of military 
radios more flexible. In the same way that a Personal Computer (PC) allows the 
selection and use of software to suit an operation, a SDR could allow flexibility 
(Mitola, 1995). The Software Communications Architecture (SCA) was born out of 
the Joint Tactical Radio System programme and provides a standard framework to 
describe radio waveforms (Bard and Kovarik, 2007). For an independent nation the 
benefits of SDR could be marginal, as using an SDR to run only one set waveform 
delivers no benefit. For a coalition the ability to share a waveform and 
communicating directly can be desirable for latency and ease of interoperability. The 
security considerations however may preclude such a direct connection. An SDR 
could have the benefit of allowing a suite of waveforms to be selected depending on 
the frequency or the type of communication (satellite, terrestrial or ground to air) 
(Vankka, 2005). A non SDR also gives this possibility but does not allow a 
waveform to be added after the radio has been purchased.  
 
The waveforms in the military space remain proprietary and vendor-specific. It is 
possible that by 2035 they will have become more commoditised and generally 
available in the same way that cellular standards are published openly. At this point 
SDR has not delivered the hoped for benefits and programs such as JTRS have had 
limited success (Goeller & Tate, 2014). SDR could allow the addition of active 
Combat Identification to a more standard waveform. The radio could monitor an 
interrogation frequency at set time frames and respond when targeted by Air or 
other assets. 
2.2 MANET 
MANET allow networks to be formed at the lower tactical level without detailed 
engineering. They use different approaches to sharing routing information but with 
the same goal of allowing data packets to be passed across the network (Royer. & 
Chai-Keong, 1999). Whilst MANET can impose its own issues on security, military 
variants have link encryption and added transmission security (Singh, Joshi & 
Singhal, 2013). MANET are already in service today but are restricted to the 
platform level. Soldier worn MANET data radios are just starting to appear but have 
limitations on range and must be incorporated to the wider tactical architecture to 
be fully usable. This is non-trivial for fully dismounted operations due to the need 
for a soldier-worn bridging node to a data backhaul. In mounted operations this is 
easier to achieve as the equipment can be carried and powered by the platform. This 
could lead to the requirement for a 'mother-ship' even in dismounted operations. 
This platform could be an autonomous robot or even an Unmanned Ariel Vehicle 
(UAV) which would have the added benefit of range and possible ISTAR functions. 
2.3 Cognitive Radio 
The lack of available spectrum is and will remain a key restriction in military 
communications. The current method of allocating chunks of spectrum is inflexible 
and inefficient (Akyildiz, et al., 2008). A more intelligent and dynamic way of using 
the spectrum could be enabled by cognitive radio (Mitola, Maguire, 1999). This 
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would maximise access to available spectrum and thus throughput whilst also 
simplifying battlespace spectrum management. There are no current true cognitive 
military radios but many MANET display similar properties, as a side effect of how 
they are implemented. Cognitive radios are being actively developed but the main 
barrier is procedural as spectrum managers need to progress from allocating chunks 
of spectrum for set times. 
2.4 Software Defined Networks 
As more complex and capable data networks begin to move in to the lower tactical 
echelons support becomes a problem. Signals trained soldiers with the required 
skills are not available at these levels and however, the soldiers have to concentrate 
on their primary role. MANETs go some way to abstracting complexity by forming 
mesh networks autonomously. However different equipments will tend to be linked 
by routers and need some element of configuration. This will be done prior to the 
commencement of operations but may have to be changed to reflect changing 
priorities. There needs to be a way to make these changes remotely and simply. 
SDN technology has the ability to do this and OpenFlow has become the open 
standard to implement (McKeown et al., 2008). It will allow remote 
monitoring/management and should be consistent across different equipment 
types. Current military communications systems have management software but it is 
often coupled to the manufacturer or system integrator. Insisting on SDN standards 
for network management can remove this restriction. The flexibility of OpenFlow 
can come at the cost of processing overhead and additional latency (Jarschel et al., 
2011). Military networks do tend to have much more significant throughput and 
latency restrictions than OpenFlow may introduce and thus the flexibility becomes 
the key factor. 
2.5 Software Defined Voice Networks 
The use of all informed voice is integral to the command and control of tactical 
operations. Historically this has meant a dedicated radio (e.g HF, VHF, UHF) with a 
common frequency and, more recently, a shared cryptographic key for secure voice. 
In order to establish new voice network the radio and security key must be shared 
with the radio. Sometimes this can be done over the air but is often is often 
restricted by security requirements. This means having to physically move to each 
radio causing delays and risking lives. Generally one radio means one voice network 
and thus command vehicles requiring multiple radios and antennas. 
 
As data communications become ubiquitous at the lower tactical levels another 
approach could address these concerns. Software Defined Voice Networks (SDVN) 
could allow voice networks to be abstracted on top of data. This is common place 
in telephony by the use of Voice over IP (VoIP) protocols (Ha & Yang, 2013). 
These underlying technologies can also be expanded to cover all informed voice. In 
the tactical domain the use of servers provides single points of failure due to enemy 
action, equipment failure or RF propagation. Therefore SDVNs need to be fault 
tolerant and distributed. 
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2.6 Commercial Off The Shelf 
The military does not lead the way in communications any more with the mobile 
revolution having greatly advanced the state of the art (Hartman, Beacken, Bishop, 
Kelly, 2011). Military systems can save money and adapt more quickly by making 
use of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) technology. In communications the latest 
4G standards offer large data rates, mobility and compatibility (Bhattacharyya & 
Bhattacharya, 2013). By 2035 this will have advanced further. A flexible military 
system will leverage these technologies but must be aware of the limitations. They 
were designed for the civil markets and do not have the same requirements as the 
military. For best utility a cellular system requires a dense network of base stations 
each with their own backhaul to the larger network. This is not available for early 
entry warfare but could possibly be established for defence of the home base or 
utilise the civilian infrastructure. In this case these key communications nodes would 
be vulnerable to attack by adversaries both kinetically and by cyber attack. The 4G 
standard does not have the same standard of security that is expected in military 
systems (Clancy, Norton, Lichtman, 2013). Whilst the security of the data can be 
layered on top of the network it is harder to add Communications Security 
(ComSec). These networks are thus vulnerable to spoofing and denial of service 
attacks. 
 
COTS communications have established bands which are allocated throughout the 
world. These bands tend to be fully allocated and cannot be assumed to be available 
to the military in anything short of general war. In coalition operations there could 
also be multiple users trying to leverage the same technologies and frequency bands. 
 
These limitations on the use of COTS technology can be mitigated with a number 
of approaches. The COTS technology can be militarised. The waveforms can be 
used adding additional ComSec. They could also be re-banded to more available 
military bands. Doing this adds to the cost and loses some flexibility but can get 
some of the benefits and remain more economical than technology developed 
purely for military use. 
 
Cell based technology can be more widely utilised with the adoption of femtocell 
base stations. These can be fitted on platforms or part of the 'mothership' concept 
mentioned earlier. This would provide a local cell service usable by dismounts with 
standard smartphone type handsets. The range will be greatly reduced from a 
planned fixed base stations but depending on the type of warfare and terrain could 
cover a platoon or company size group. The femtocell will have to have its own 
MANET to connect in to a wider network. In more difficult terrain satellite 
connections could be used. 
3. Application Layer and Software Infrastructure 
The provided communications network gives the ability to share information 
between the required software applications. This will include Battle Management, 
Messaging, Chat, ISTAR and other special-to-arms applications. Whilst we can 
predict some of these applications, each different operation and task will have its 
own Information Exchange Requirements (IER). This in turn will lead to different 
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requirements and potentially new software applications. Coalitions also may require 
the use of new applications. The way that these applications communicate with each 
other is through protocols and data formats. Whilst standards do exist there can be 
many competing ones to choose from and they can be inconsistently implemented. 
Some key areas of software, protocols and formats that driving the design of the 
tactical architecture will be considered in this section. 
3.1 Protocols 
Applications communicate using protocols. There are several levels that these 
operate starting at the physical layer or Layer 1/2 in the OSI model (Zimmermann, 
1980) which includes Ethernet and Wi-Fi up to the application layer (Layer 7). 
Adopting these standards makes communicating easier. At layer 4 we have 
Transport Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP). These 
protocols are at the heart of the modern network and universally supported. Most 
military data radios support TCP and UDP, however the choice of which can greatly 
affect the efficiency of the network. 
 
TCP is a connection oriented protocol and positively establishes a connection 
before any data is sent (RFC792, 1981). TCP suffers from a number of well-known 
performance problems, which become more severe with longer delay, frequent 
errors, and large bandwidth (Vankka, 2013). UDP is generally more efficient on 
military networks as it is connectionless (RFC768, 1980). This saves a lot of 
overhead at the cost of the application layer having to ensure that a full message can 
be reconstructed. The packets can arrive in any order or not at all and the higher 
level protocol must deal with this unlike TCP where the network stack will ensure 
packets are presented in order and losses are re-requested.. 
 
Some military Information Technology (IT) systems use UDP only for messaging 
and have proprietary application level services dealing with these issues. Whilst there 
is no accepted standard in the tactical domain, there are standards based protocols 
which could be used in place of TCP. Stream Control Transmission Protocol 
(SCTP) (Stewart, 2007) is an alternative to TCP and UDP. It has been shown to be 
more efficient for transporting web services over military networks (Johnsen, 
Bloebaum, Avlesen, Spjelkavik, Vik, 2013). SCTP support is not universal in 
Operating Systems (OS) and network devices. The advantages of SCTP will vary 
depending on the underlying network implementation. 
 
The intelligent selection of protocols can also make the most efficient use of the 
underlying network at the application layer. Many modern systems use the 
Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) to transfer data. Web browsing relies on 
HTTP as does the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) which is commonly used 
to deliver Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). HTTP is delivered on top of TCP 
and thus has disadvantages on tactical networks. Google is producing a 
complimentary protocol called Quick UDP Internet Connect (QUIC) (Carlucci, De 
Cicco & Mascolo, 2015). This allows HTTP type data to be transferred over UDP 
and by doing so allows data to be multiplexed more easily. This is important for 
wireless transfers such as MANET as it allows the packets to be concatenated into 
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larger frames for transmission. HTTP over TCP does not readily allow this as 
acknowledgement must first be received for a set window size of bytes. QUIC is not 
yet a standard but a sister protocol from Google for TCP called SPDY which has 
now been incorporated in to the recently released HTTP2 specification. In the 
assessed time-frame it is likely that QUIC or a successor will be more widely 
adopted. 
3.2 Service Oriented Architecture 
Enterprise architectures have made use of SOA for some time. It provides a level of 
abstraction and presents a common interface for the outside world. SOA 
architectures have only begun to be exploited in military computing at the strategic 
level of command (Zoughbi et al, 2011). The use of SOA in a more tactical 
environment is more challenging with near real time requirements and a restricted 
network (Saarelainen, Timonen, 2011). One key technology enabler for SOA is the 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP). SOAP provides a standard way to describe 
and share information and services which allows different applications to connect 
without knowledge of the underlying data model. 
 
SOAP can describe simple transactions and data but when dealing with more 
complex formats such as geographic information, they usually extend existing 
standards such as Geographic Markup Language (GML), Keyhole Markup 
Language (KML) or ESRI Shape files (Schnabel & Hurni, 2009). Applications used 
for Battle Management may support only a subset of these formats. Even with 
supported formats the implementation can vary which can potentially cause the data 
to lose fidelity. Therefore when using SOAP, data formats must be considered when 
selecting applications and for interoperability. 
 
One way to resolve format issues and to structure information exchange is an 
Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) using a Publish/Subscribe model. An ESB provides 
another level of abstraction which among other things allows protocol conversion 
and data transformation (Chappell, 2004). This can consume data in multiple 
formats, normalise it, store it and send it on to subscribed applications. The Afghan 
Mission Network had such a service which was called the Publish and Subscribe 
(PaS) server. This concept has been taken forward and forms part of the Federated 
Mission Network concept (NATO Interoperability Standards and Profiles). An ESB 
is a complex software architecture but it provides flexibility and thus aids 
interoperability. 
3.3 Semantic Web 
One of the main benefits of an ESB approach is the ability to extract and search on 
semantic data. As the ESB ingests and normalises data it can hold it in a structured 
manner. It can then be drawn from multiple formats including human readable text. 
The data can be stored using the standard Resource Description Framework (RDF) 
and then searched using tools like SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language 
(SPARQL). This means other applications can understand and exploit it 
unambiguously based on shared ontologies. It also means that the ESB can be 
queried in a powerful way giving relevant results. 
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SOA and ESB provide many benefits but in the tactical domain can have severe 
drawbacks. If a central server was used then it could become a single point of failure 
and a bottle neck in the communications network. A tactical network should have 
system and geographic redundancy due to the effects of terrain and enemy action. 
SOA can be distributed across constrained networks and this can ensure access to 
information and remove pressure points from the data network (Ali, Hailong, Wei, 
2013) 
3.4 Applications 
The choice of application will depend on the requirements and particular operation. 
This can change quickly due to the tactical environment or shared working with 
coalition partners. The key is to retain flexibility so that new applications can be 
incorporated quickly. This has proved difficult with monolithic C4 systems from 
defence vendors. As well as commercial lock in there are genuine concerns about 
system management and security when incorporating new software. Some mitigating 
techniques that can bring back flexibility are as follows: 
 
Containerisation. Virtual Machines (VM) can be used to isolate instances of 
software but are quite a large overhead. A virtual machine runs a full OS and 
requires allocated memory and resources. This is possible especially when we 
consider Moore's law progress in the time-frame, however if each application has a 
full VM then this must be updated as well as the underlying OS. A lightweight 
modern solution is containerisation which uses the underlying OS but isolates the 
application environment (Dua, Raja, Kakadia, 2014). This means that applications 
and any dependencies can be updated without affecting others. It also keeps 
applications isolated so security concerns are reduced. 
 
Open Source. The use of Open Source or Free Software can reduce costs when 
implementing a system but more importantly it provides greater freedom. If the 
source code is available then the system manager is not dependent on one vendor 
and their support. They also have the opportunity to analyse and improve the actual 
software. Whilst there is not a much military specific open source software use of 
standards based technologies discussed in this paper means that open source 
software can be adapted to the military need (Loechel, Mihelcic, Pickl, 2012). 
4. Architectural approach 
The above technology areas allow military requirements to be met but a system of 
systems approach is required to combine them to be a usable capability.  
 
The combination of these technologies is best done in a 'golf bag' type approach. 
This allows the technology to be combined in a way that matches the environment 
and meets the commanders needs for an operation. So for example in a fixed 
environment a COTS cell based communications can be used and linked straight 
back in to the strategic system. For more dynamic high intensity warfare a more 
militarised MANET communications network can be used with satellite based reach 
back to strategic systems. 
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The required applications can be drawn from those already integrated and trained or 
a specialist application can be easily incorporated. The ESB means a new application 
can more easily draw data from the wider system. This also makes interoperability 
easier with the ESB being able to transform the data and send out on another 
protocol. This for example could enable Air Land integration by sending the ground 
picture out on Link 16/22. Business rules can be applied for information release so 
potentially the system could even interface with other governments or Non 
Governmental Organisations. 
5. Candidate Architectures 
 
To illustrate the architectural approach and how some of the discussed technologies 
can be utilised a number of scenarios are discussed. A brief description of the 
scenario will be given along with a candidate architecture that could be deployed. 
5.1 Software Architecture 
The software architecture remains the same for all the scenarios. As in Fig 1 the 
architecture is layered on top of the networks discussed below. A federated ESB will 
be established to allow sharing of information with redundancy. Standard external 
linkages such as to the Air and Sea Domain will be already integrated and provided 
by an ESB.  
 
Figure 1. Candidate Architecture 
5.2 Interoperability 
Interoperability would be provided by the ESB in conjunction with firewalled touch 
points. The ESB will provide data normalisation to prevent unintended data leaking. 
The release of information can be implemented in the ESB by business rules or by 
positive release by a staff officer. Other external connections can be quickly 
specified and implemented using the ESB and a firewalled point of contact.  
5.3 Protection of the home base from undeveloped adversaries 
In this scenario operations are restricted to the countries own home base. The 
threat could be from subversive or state sponsored terrorists. The adversary does 
not have an advanced tecnological base but will make use of any available means to 
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create an effect. This architecture makes use of fixed infrastructure between the 
different headquarters and agencies (Fig 2). These will be wired links as part of the 
national infrastructure. Mobile units and temporary headquarters will be connected 
using a cell based infrastructure. This will be a combination of the nations safety 
networks which are presently usually based on Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) 
but in the time frame examined are likely to be a LTE or even 5G based safety 
networks. Where required capacity can be increased by using the civilian cell 
network. For those users in remote areas not covered by the cell network satellite 
means (both military and civilian) will be used. 
 
Figure 2. Protection of the home base from undeveloped adversaries 
 
This network will be very capable in terms of throughput and connectivity. The user 
will access using the same systems they are used to during peace time. The reliance 
on fixed infrastructure however does make it vulnerable to attack. Even a 
technologically disadvantaged opponent can target cell towers and other network 
infrastructure. This means that physical security will have to be enhanced in these 
sites which will cost manpower and equipment. The use of standard infrastructure 
would allow supporters for the opponent to mount cyber attacks. State sponsors 
would likely have the ability to have an effect but also 'hacktivist' groups can use 
known vulnerabilities to impede the network. 
5.4 Protection of the home base from advanced adversaries 
In this scenario operations still take place within the home base but against a more 
advanced adversary. This may be an invasion from another state or civil unrest 
supported by an advanced opponent. The architecture takes a more hybrid 
approach and still uses some cell based and fixed infrastructure but supplements 
with more robust military communications (Figure 3). It is assumed the opponent 
will attempt to disrupt communications by kinetic and cyber means. The 
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electromagnetic spectrum will be more contended with the enemy seeking to deny 
its use. A well equipped opponent will target vulnerabilities in cell based 
communications. This could lead to information being compromised or the network 
being blocked preventing information flow. Military communications systems will 
provide better Transmission Security (TRANSEC) and flexibility. In high intensity 
conflict the network will have to adapt quickly as the tactical units manoeuvre to 
gain advantage. MANET and connections to engineered links at the strategic level 
will allow the network to adapt to changing circumstances and enemy action. 
 
This architecture provides a robust and adaptable network. It will not be able to 
offer the throughput or low latency of a fixed infrastructure. The entire network 
infrastructure will be organic to the tactical units and thus additional physical 
security will not be required. The cost of this specialised military equipment will be 
greater than utilising existing or commercially available equipment. To mitigate this 
smaller numbers may be bought for immediate action and training with an ability to 
quickly increase holdings during escalation to war.  
 
Figure 3. Protection of the home base from advanced adversaries 
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5.5 Military operations outside the home base – low intensity 
In this scenario a country is deploying forces outside its own borders. This would be 
for low intensity operations such as disaster relief, humanitarian or peace 
enforcement. The host nation, depending on how advanced they are, could have 
communications infrastructure. The infrastructure could be used in a benign 
environment but may be compromised due to disaster, an opponent or the number 
of other agencies trying to utilise them. The architecture uses cell services where 
available but also allows military MANET where the force density and deployment 
allows (Figure 4). Satellite communications are used for reach back to the home 
base but also for disadvantaged users out with cell coverage or typical MANET 
distances. 
 
The architecture for this sort of operation needs to be flexible as the situation will 
change. Fixed cell networks may not be accessible initially but may become available 
later. If many agencies or nations are in the area it will put great demands on 
infrastructure and spectrum availability. Whilst the generic software architecture 
remains the same, external connections to relief agencies or the host nation may be 
required. This can be established by implementing the needed formats and 
protocols on the ESB and connecting via a firewalled connection.  
 
 
Figure 4. Military operations outside the home base – low intensity 
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Figure 5. Military operations outside the home base – high intensity 
5.6 operations outside the home base – high intensity 
In this scenario a country is deploying a conventional force in to high intensity 
conflict in another area. This is likely to be as part of a coalition so interoperability is 
important. Access to any infrastructure or availability of spectrum is likely to be very 
limited. Enemy action and own forces manoeuvring will have a large impact upon 
network topologies. The enemy could be technically capable and hence the use of 
civilian infrastructure could have risks in terms of availability and cyber attack. 
 
The architecture is mostly based on military off the shelf equipment but does allow 
a mix of cellular technology where the situation allows (Figure 5). The cell base 
stations could be deployed by the force as semi-permanent base stations of as 
mobile femtocells.  
 
The reliance on military technologies will mean that throughput will be reduced 
from that provided in a more fixed infrastructure. The network should be more 
resilient to enemy action and to electronic warfare. 
6. Other Lines of Development 
The technology and the architecture presented will only become a usable system 
once the other lines of development are considered and developed. 
 
Doctrine and training must allow the user to not only use but exploit the system to 
provide military capability. The system must be supported by a clear support 
strategy. Personnel must be properly trained and the lines of support documented 
and understood. 
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Transition to service can be very disruptive when new systems and ways of working 
are rolled out. The nature of the suggested technologies and the architectural 
approach lend themselves to a gradual roll out. The software architecture could be 
rolled out across a legacy data network. The use of the ESB can allow legacy 
applications to share data more easily with others on the system. This also allows 
benefits to be accrued early and avoid a disruptive transition. 
 
The approach to the acquisition process must allow the same flexibility that is in the 
architectural approach. One vendor providing the entire solution, whilst simpler to 
contract, leads to vendor lock in and the pace and cost being set by that vendor. By 
ensuring open standards and with the use of open source technologies the right 
vendors can be selected for the given technologies. By favouring open source 
software it is also possible to change vendors mid development without losing the 
work already done. 
 
This approach to acquisition requires an intelligent customer who understands the 
user need as well as the technology. Where possible this should come from within 
the military but when those skills are not available contractors separate and 
independent from the main suppliers should be used. It is important that the 
military should retain all the Intellectual Property (IP) and system ownership of the 
design and architecture. 
7. Conclusions and future work 
In this paper some of the key technology elements that could help specifying an 
independent tactical domain have been covered. The need for flexibility and 
independence from fixed solutions has been emphasised. 
 
An architectural approach which provides a standards based network by the most 
efficient means for the tactical environment is proposed. The software layer has 
several methods to ensure flexibility as well as ease of implementation and 
maintenance. The use of containerisation ensures that applications are isolated and 
easily upgradable. The embedding of an ESB in the architecture ensures that data 
can be shared and structured for exploitation by semantic tools. It aids 
interoperability and makes the transition from legacy applications more seamless. 
 
The technology itself is not sufficient to deliver military capability. The other 
elements must be considered and aligned with the technology development. An 
acquisition approach that retains as much IP and power within the military rather 
than a single selected vendor is preferred. 
 
A number of candidate architectures were given as an example rather than a 
template as it is important for the commander and their J6 staff to retain flexibility. 
The scenarios show a range of intensities both in and out of the home base. Any 
operation will be unique with its own restrictions and requirements therefore the 
architecture will be planned based on matching the available capabilities.  
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Future work should look at the efficiency of the proposed technologies in a 
deployed tactical network. Particular emphasis should be put on a distributed 
architecture that avoids points of failure and makes efficient use of the underlying 
network. 
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Abstract  
Trust management has been a topic of keen interest in recent years. There has been 
a lot of discussion as to what new opportunities it can bring to markets, what 
benefits it can offer, and what system development possibilities it enables for 
software development. In this paper we discuss trust management in a military 
context. We examine the key features of the Circle of Trust in public authority 
environments. We address the most essential problems and obstacles to be 
considered before the benefits of Circle of Trust can be fully enabled therein. As a 
solution to problems with the information transfer management, we propose a 
novel approach utilizing the modern cryptographic technology. The discussion and 
views presented in this paper can be adopted in any organization with doubts 
concerning the sensitive and classified contents of current ICT systems. 
Keywords  
Trust management; Cryptography; Security; Military 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Importance of trust management is increasing as the Internet is more open for 
access, different collaboration tools and social networking become more common. 
The relevance of trust management is gradually becoming more significant, but the 
multilateral nature of the concept, generally trustworthy parties and large data sets 
with high response time requirements have kept commercial activators and 
applications away from production use in public authority environments. 
 
Public authorities in security field have sought and developed numerous means to 
improve cooperation by ICT solutions. Different kind of collaboration tools and 
environments has been deployed and integrations between systems and data 
storages have developed. It is obvious that concepts like semantic knowledge 
processing, connectivity and social networking enable improved cooperation 
between authorities. However these concepts cause also new challenges. Openness 
can be hard to manage in highly secured environment. Also processing of the 
critical operative information increases hostile interest on system environment. 
 
In public authority environment the trust to other stakeholder is unreserved in 
relation to profession and officiality. In collaboration and cooperation context, 
participating authorities compose virtual community with only trusted parties. We 
call this kind of consortium as a circle of trust. Within circle of trust, the participant 
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shares information in order that the other participants will improve their succession 
in operations. This enhances the overall performance of the virtual community from 
which every participant gain benefit. 
 
The special case of information sharing is to delegate operative situational data for 
improving situational awareness in the circle of trust. This kind of collaboration 
improves the accuracy of the individual awareness in each actor and enriches the 
awareness of all actors within operation. This cooperation enables better 
communications, safe procedures and more effective actions in operations 
throughout participating authority organizations. 
 
In this paper, we will discuss issues and problems to be considered when 
implementing circle of trust concept in core authority systems. We define the key 
features and characteristics of such a high security environment. We also 
characterize the environment’s limitations and provide examples of corresponding 
measurable parameters. We will narrow our observations to military systems in 
which the need for computational capacity is high and the reliability of information 
is always critical. In military environment we must ensure data flow correctness. In 
this paper we discuss on a situation where a trusted node forfeited credibility and we 
should control the information or knowledge the node receives from our trusted 
network. As a solution to problems with the adoption of circle of trust in public 
authority environments, we propose an approach that manages the delivery of 
information within the closed circle of trust and improves the security of overall 
system by reducing the risk of information being compromised. 
 
2 Situational Awareness and Trust Management in Military Context 
 
Improving situation awareness has become more critical in public authority 
operations and especially in military context. The possibilities and utilizations of 
situation awareness have increased together with technical evolution. Sensors and 
mobile devices increase the effectivity of collecting data from locations that 
traditionally have been difficult to access. More data can be collected and stored 
than previously, which enables view on situation to be more truthful, accurate and 
comprehensive.  
 
The most severe challenges on improving situation awareness are related to 
refinement of significant information from huge amount of data, unstable data 
transfer connections and especially in field operations, limited data capacities [1]. 
Also data correctness, reliability, redundancy and timeliness have been research 
issues or discussed in several publications [1]. Less discussion has been addressed to 
trust evaluation of the data source or the security issues on delegating the situational 
data to recipients with different trust levels. This aspect is relevant in military 
environment where there is always possibility for a malicious actor is receiving our 
confidential information or sending unreliable data to our decision making process. 
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In this paper we adopt the definition of trust presented by Grandison and Sloman 
because of the simplicity yet complete enough. Trust is “a quantified belief by a 
trustor with respect to the competence, honesty, security and dependability of a 
trustee within a specified context” [2]. Moreover, in this paper we limit our 
observation on computative trust management. Widely accepted features on 
computative trust management include subjectivity, the expected probability and 
relevance [3, 4].  
 
In military context participants of the trust relation are bound to a role. A 
participant represents some actor or unit within an organization. Unit has a task and 
a goal and special expertise specified by the organization. It is important to 
understand that when two actors from different units interact, one trusts the 
represented role not the actor itself. Yet the trustworthiness between two roles can 
be fixed on process level, the individual actor might have specific preferences, 
interests or experience which affects to quantitative trust. Similarly, data providers 
such as sensors can be modelled as an actor in trust relation and represented by an 
ownership of an organizational unit. 
 
3 Circle of Trust characteristics and benefits in Military environments 
 
In this paper we define Circle of Trust as a consortium of a specified subject with 
only trusted parties. It means that each participant has sufficient amount of trust to 
other participant in relation of the subject. The sufficient can be considered as 
readiness for deliver and receive knowledge unconditionally without risking own 
operative ability. The motivation for creating the consortium is to construct a united 
force to gain improved capability in operations with same goal. For achieving the 
goal it is essential to have an open and transparent information exchange between 
the participants. To sustain the circle, all parties should have indirect or direct 
benefit from collaboration and cooperation with each other. The participants rely 
operative enhancement that they gain from the participation of the circle. 
Enhancement can be for example improvement of efficiency in operative actions or 
overall reduction of operative costs. In practice the actions can be trading situational 
information between participants. Moreover we argue that the Circle of Trust 
formed by combining the public authorities from different countries is the only real 
possibility to improve the situational awareness in order to operate successfully in 
cyberwar. Malicious actions in cyberwar are conducted always from international 
level and often routing is hiding the origins of the actor. Resolving the actor needs 
international collaboration with openness of information. We should not forget that 
defending from malicious action on national level can be only reactive by nature. 
That is why countermeasures are effective only when performed also on 
international level. The information collected by international consortium can help 
to identify the existence of malicious actor and to detect false information from the 
attacked systems. 
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The example of Circle of Trust is illustrated in Figure 1. In Figure 1 A represents us 
as a situational information provider. B and C are recipients of our information. 
Arcs represent the direction of information. Because information trading should 
happen in both directions, arcs are represented also from the recipient to us. Each 
arc contains two parameters s for situational information and w for the weighted 
trust between information provider and recipient. It is notable, that if for example 
wAC ≠ wAB then sAC ≠ sAB,. In practice this means, that the situational information 
provided by the provider is not the same unless the trust relation between provider 
and recipient are exactly the same. It can also be noted that the trustworthiness of 
the recipient is in direct relation to the correctness and completeness of the 
situational information provided by the information provider. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Circle of Trust 
 
As stated before, with Circle of Trust situational awareness can be improved by 
trading the intelligence and reconnaissance information within the participants of 
the circle. Trading is usually mutual sharing where the quality and the amount of 
traded information are in balance.  
 
The trading can also be used for identifying possible leakages. If there is a suspected 
malicious actor as a member in Circle of Trust, with labelled or water marked 
information to participants it is possible to detect and identify the source of leakage 
by following the trace of the information. If there is certainty of an intrusion to 
system, with Circle of Trust deceptive information can be fed to malicious actor 
without breaking the routines and not disconnecting the actor from the grid too 
soon. More over the capabilities of a hostile actor can be monitored and evaluated 
by observing the actions it performs in controlled environment. 
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Circle of Trust is a scalable and generic concept. In international scale we can 
consider a military alliance such as NATO as an example of Circle of Trust. On 
national scale example can found from the collaboration with public authorities of 
safety like between police forces and rescue service. On organizational level we can 
have example from ministry like Ministry of the Interior and all the agencies that it 
conducts. On the technological level all nodes in a high security network can form a 
Circle of Trust. 
 
4 Some challenges within Circle of Trust in High Security Environment 
 
In this chapter we discuss more on challenges identified within the Circle of Trust. 
The circle of trust should enable openness of information exchange, but the 
openness also increases the risk of revealing too much sensitive information to 
public.  
 
Situation data contains always some information about the collector or origins of 
data by nature. This information can relate to location information, resources or 
capability. This information can be used against the originator. Revealing 
information is always risk and the delivery should be somehow controlled so that 
the information, knowledge or capabilities are not leaked to any hostile or untrusted 
recipient. 
 
4.1 Absolute trust does not exist in reality 
 
Within closed Circle of Trust, some parties are always more trustworthy than others. 
For example in military alliance some nations are in more deep cooperation than 
others and some nations can have doubts from history to others. In that sense the 
sufficient amount of trust can be varied a lot between the actors. The consequence 
is that the participants in the Circle of Trust are not in the same level. In authority 
cooperation trust within own organization is usually unreserved. This trust is based 
on mutual experience, common procedures and professional community. A lot 
harder is to trust another authority and different organization. We can find this 
element of distrust in each level of Circle of Trust concept. The main concern is the 
leakage of sensitive information illustrated in Figure 2. After revealing situational 
information for recipient C, we are not able to manage the revealed information. If 
C has a connection with party D, which does not belong to our original Circle of 
Trust, C might still provide some information to D. Assuming that A is the only 
information source, the D will receive information sCD  sAC. 
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Figure 2. Leakage of situational information 
 
Another dimension of this challenge is the publicity of distrust. If one actor is not 
ready to release all information unconditionally to all other actors but is bound to 
principality of openness within the circle, how publicly this limitation of released 
information can be made. 
 
4.2 Managing information delivery in open network 
 
In previous chapter we discussed on leakage of information. Regardless of how 
much we have trust on our allies, we need their information. To receive information 
from other parties the usual convention is to give or send information collected by 
the one. This actually forms a trading system where tradable information is defined 
by its usefulness, timeliness, trustworthiness, accuracy and comprehension. As 
stated in previous chapter, absolute trust does not exist in reality. Circle of Trust or 
any alliance is trying to form a framework where quality levels of information are 
agreed in written and we can rely that at least the exchange of information itself 
actualizes. Information providers try to minimize the amount of sent information 
but still receiving the maximum amount of information. The main goal of the 
recipient is to have sufficient amount of information to form awareness of a 
situation. The interesting question is that what is the sufficient amount of provided 
information to gain that goal? 
 
Another issue arises when information is sent to the recipient. After transmission of 
information the provider loses all control to the sent information. That when a 
receiver has interpreted the information, the receiver immediately owns the 
information and can use it to any purpose needed. This includes also sending the 
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information to other partners, avoided or simply not intended by original source. 
Having secured connection does not solve this issue since for the received 
information is presented as decrypted form.  
 
The accumulation of information can be also a problem. This situation is illustrated 
in Figure 3. If A sends data fragment sAB to recipient B and data fragment sAC is 
send to recipient C, it is possible that both of the recipients send the data fragments 
to less trustworthy participant D. D can combine the both data fragments sAB  sAC 
and create more comprehensive situation and indirectly form an increased threat to 
the originator A. 
 
 
Figure 3. Accumulation of situational information. 
 
4.3 Collateral damage of deception 
 
Previously we described the possibility of deception with the identified intrusion in 
the secure environment. The challenge is how the intrusion is notified to other 
participants in the circle without risking that the information is reached to the 
intruder. This problem setting is formalized in Figure 4., in which A has some 
distrust with C (i.e. wAC is small) and wants to send false information sAC. At the 
same time C and B have a strong trust relation (i.e. wBC and wCB are great) and also A 
and B trust each other. If C transmits the information sAC as sCB, B receives false 
data which can be very harmful of course for B, but also for A. After exposure of 
deception the trustweight wBA is most probable to decline, which influences the 
future information exchange and trade balance.  
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Figure 4. Collateral damage of deception. 
 
A special case of this problem occurs when one participant in Circle of Trust identifies an 
intruder within the Circle. If the other participants are not trustworthy enough to identify 
the intruder and the deceptive data is fed to the intruder, how can we notify the other 
participants not to trust information that they receive from the intruder.  
 
5 Overcoming obstacles by utilizing cryptographic technology 
 
In this chapter we present a proposed solution to overcome problems in previous 
chapters. We adopt the latest research results in cryptography conducted by Huang 
et al. [5, 6, 7, 8]. Huang presents a novel approach to existing public key encryption 
schemes. For our problem we utilize his commutative encryption algorithm based 
on ElGamal encryption [6, 9]. With commutative encryption we are able to encrypt 
information more than once with different public keys. The usefulness in our 
problem is that the decryption order may vary as needed. 
 
In our approach the basic idea is to reveal all the possible solutions of situation 
awareness for each counterpart. The participants have individual keys for encryption 
of the solution, but they are not aware the accuracy or exact trustworthiness of the 
decrypted information. In principle everyone has access to every decrypted solution, 
but only the source, the provider has the information of correct original information 
and which key has the best decryption in order to have original information. The 
approach is illustrated in Figure 5. f(Akey) is the encryption on original information 
provided by A which results the encrypted information A’. For each recipient there 
is a key which decrypts the information with f’ resulting the recipient specific 
information (in Figure 5 [B, C, D]). It is noteworthy that there should be a key or 
several keys for parties outside the Circle of Trust. 
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Figure 5. Encryption and decryption of information with different levels of trust. 
 
In practice this is achieved by encrypting the information so, that the each of the 
decryption key results a valid outcome. According the Huang encryption f(Akey) 
contains all the encryption for each recipient. That is f(Bkey), f(Ckey) and f(Dkey). After 
keys are delivered to recipients the encrypted information is opened for open access. 
Solution relies on the fact that none of the recipients knows the actual 
trustworthiness of their received decryption. For example with information trading 
between B and C the differences can be identified, but the accurate reliability cannot 
be solved. In Table 1 the example of information modification is presented. Here 
the modification is made on observation level, but it can also be on object attribute 
level. Trust level represents how much trust we have on the recipient and how 
accurate information we want to provide. 
 
Table 1. Example of information modification towards partners with different trust levels. 
 
 Own correct 
information 
Open Public 
Information 
Decrypted 
with key B 
Decrypted 
with key C 
Decrypted 
with key D 
Trust level 100 0 90 50 10 
Observation 1 A red car Vehicle A red car A car A blue car 
Observation 2 A fighter plane Aerial vehicle A plane A plane UFO 
Observation 3 An assault 
helicopter 
Aerial vehicle An assault 
helicopter 
A helicopter Vehicle 
Observation 4 Drone Aerial vehicle Drone UAV UFO 
 
For a computational issue, the malicious actor has no possibility to decrypt all 
possible solutions and if they do that, they are not aware which one of the results is 
the most accurate representation of the encrypted information. Moreover we argue 
that even if the malicious actor could collect all the decrypted instances of the 
information from certain time, it cannot reliably determine what represent the best 
information. For example in Table 1 recipient D might have a problem resolving is 
the observation 3 a land vehicle of an aerial vehicle. Also outsider cannot solve what 
kind of aerial vehicle observation 4 is. 
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We are aware that this solution works best in timely systems where the amount of 
information is huge. Of course with infrequent high security information exchange 
other conventional encryption methods are more useful. 
 
It should be also noted that in Circle of Trust all participants are not necessarily 
directly bound to each other. All participants within the Circle are bound to each 
other at least with transitive trust. Despite the unconditional trust exists within the 
whole circle of trust, the absolute trust is decreased depending the amount of 
transitions and their relative trustweights. This construction forces to control the 
delivery of information in order to prevent the leakage of information and 
knowledge. 
 
At the end we want to emphasize that presented approach is scalable from different 
abstraction levels of Circle of Trust. It applies to multinational organizations as well 
as high security network information exchange between nodes.  
 
6 Related work 
In this chapter we will present a brief overview of existing concepts and 
technologies that are discussed similar problems such as Circle of Trust. First we 
observe the Knot concept. 
 
Circle of Trust can be considered as a virtual community. That sense it is shares the 
similar context than Gal-Oz et al. have presented in their approach on knots [10]. A 
knot is defined as a subset of community members identified as having overall 
strong trust relations among them by directly from trust model of indirectly via 
transitive trust. Moreover knots are groups of members that can rely on each other’s 
recommendations even if they did not rate the same experts. However the Gal-Oz 
model emphasizes the symmetry of trust. In Circle of Trust, trust might vary also 
when changing the recipient to a sender and vice versa. It means that the trust 
between the actors is not symmetrical. In some cases recipient has to rely the 
information provided by the provider, even if there is a suspicion that the 
information received is not good quality. Despite the doubt, it might be that the 
information traded back is best that can be provided. This kind of asymmetric 
situation occurs when the trading parts have significantly different capabilities of 
providing and testing the reliability of transmitted data. The technically stronger and 
with larger resources can use deception at some extend and demand full accuracy 
and highest quality in return. In other words, trust varies between the actors in the 
context of Circle of Truth. The Knot concept should contain also a mechanism for 
weighed trust relations. In that way we can quantify the distrust in Circle of Trust. 
 
Second we examine the idea of trust transitivity. Jøsang et al. have published several 
papers where they have discussed on features and possibilities of trust transitivity 
[11]. This research has a potential platform for enhancement where transitivity is 
limited by threshold when weighed arcs are chained. However this does not avoid 
the fact that the first recipient owns the received data after interpretation. Trust 
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transitivity method needs an external broker to control the threshold of the chained 
arcs. We still find that kind of system vulnerable for exposure of data. 
 
Third we point out that Chen et al. [12] have published a methodology where 
attributes of trust are delegated subjective trust evaluation. The approach should 
consider the aspects of distrust and include some mechanism to avoid exposure of 
data regardless of the trust values. However, delegation of attributes and building a 
global trust map can quantify the accumulation problem and at least increase the 
knowledge on leaked and possibly accumulated information. It might also be 
interesting approach by itself to the collateral damage of deception problem, 
because the trust values can prevent sending distrusted information via trusted arcs. 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
In this paper we examined the Circle of Trust concept within the military context. 
We stated that the absolute trust never exists and information exchange is necessary 
in order to build a comprehensive situational awareness. We identified the three 
primary obstacles to adopting Circle of Trust in a military context and examined 
possible solutions to overcoming them. We proposed a new approach by using 
modern cryptographic technology. We ensure the secrecy of own collected sensitive 
data by releasing different versions of information for different recipients. This is 
done by encrypting the information simultaneously with different keys which are 
delivered one for each recipient. The decryption result can be controlled on 
encryption phase. We argue, that revealing all solutions of decryption is so large, any 
malicious actor has no capability to solve in reasonable time which solution has 
most accurate information in which parameter. 
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